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ABSTRACT 
 The National Quality Award Program, sponsored by the American Healthcare 
Association National Center for Assisted Living, was implemented to cultivate continuous 
quality improvement in nursing homes and assisted living facilities.  Based upon the Baldridge 
Criteria for Performance Excellence, the program utilizes a systems-based or Big “Q” approach 
to quality and requires applicants to examine seven categories of their organizational 
environment including: 1) leadership, 2) strategy, 3) customers, 4) measurement, analysis, and 
knowledge management, 5) workforce, 6) operations, and 7) results.  The subsequent dissertation 
examines whether award status is associated with better performance on publicly reported quality 
measures and financial performance within the nursing home setting.  Findings suggest 
implementation of Baldridge principles may promote improved quality; however, further 
research is warranted to fully understand the relationship.    
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CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND 
Malcolm Baldridge Criterial for Performance Excellence 
The American Health Care Association and the National Center for Assisted Living 
(AHCA/NCAL) established the National Quality Award Program (NQAP) for long-term care 
organizations (e.g., skilled nursing care centers, assisted living facilities) in 1996. The NQAP 
emanates from the Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award (MBNQA) instituted by the U.S. 
Congress in 1987 under the leadership of President Ronald Reagan. In response to strong foreign 
competition in the automobile manufacturing industry, the Reagan Administration sought to 
promote awareness of quality management and improve competitiveness in U.S. companies 
(Leonard & McGuire, 2007).  
Accordingly, Malcolm Baldridge, the Secretary of Commerce, developed a model for 
performance improvement, which identified essential elements (Baldridge principles) required 
for performance excellence. Based upon the work of other quality management pioneers 
including Robert Deming, Joseph Juran and Karou Ishikawa, the Malcolm Baldridge Criteria for 
Performance Excellence (Baldridge Criteria) employed a systems-based, or big “Q” approach, 
wherein businesses utilize a broad, comprehensive lens to assess quality. Quality improvement 
efforts using a big “Q” approach examine all facets of a business (e.g., internal/external customer 
relationships, the voice of the consumer, financial performance) as well as product and service 
performance quality. Conversely, a little “q” approach focuses on one facet or measure of quality 
in a specific area. However, to truly achieve performance excellence, all systems within an 
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organization must operate at a high level and be aligned (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2015). 
Baldridge’s system-based model became the basis for the Malcolm Baldrige National 
Quality Improvement Act and the origination of the MBNQA.  Accordingly, the legislation 
mandates the U.S. President to recognize companies which have demonstrated excellence in 
quality ("Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Improvement Act of 1987," 1987). The validity of 
the Baldridge Criteria has been demonstrated (Evans & Jack, 2003).  Specifically, Evans and 
Jack (2003) illustrated a relationship between Baldridge Criteria-based internal management 
approaches and various endogenous (e.g., employee satisfaction, process performance, internal 
productivity) and exogenous (e.g., customer satisfaction, market share, financial performance) 
factors. Additionally, an empirical test by Goldstein and Schweikhart (2002) suggest the 
framework is an appropriate and effective quality management assessment tool to improve 
organizational performance in healthcare settings.   
The National Quality Award Program 
 The national-level MBQNA serves as the basis for the NQAP to assist and support long 
term care providers in their quality journey (Baldridge Performance Excellence Program, 2015). 
Established on the basis of the Baldridge Criteria used in the MBNQA, the NQAP is a three-
level (Bronze, Silver, Gold) progressive program, which provides evaluation criteria, educational 
resources and tools for nursing homes (NHs) to conduct performance improvement activities by 
fostering a systems-based or big “Q” model to assess performance (Baldridge Performance 
Excellence Program, 2015). NQAP utilizes three progressive levels defined as: 1) Bronze-
Commitment to Quality; 2) Silver-Achievement in Quality; and 3) Excellence in Quality 
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(American Health Care Association, 2016). In order to progress to the next level, the criteria for 
the prior level(s) must also be achieved. 
Eligibility for a NQAP award includes the following: NHs must: 1) be an AHCA/NCAL 
member in good standing; 2) have the ability to produce direct care staffing turnover data for the 
past three years; 3) have undergone three Medicare/Medicaid certification surveys with survey 
deficiency scores less than their state’s average and must not have received a regulatory 
deficiency at the immediate jeopardy or substandard quality of care level; and, 4) agree to 
participate in a quality award education program during the application year. Similar to the 
MBNQA, AHCA/NCAL’s NQAP utilizes a trained board of examiners to assess applications 
and evidence of performance improvements of NH applicants.   
Healthcare Criteria for Performance Excellence 
Based upon the Baldridge Criteria’s core set of overarching values and concepts (e.g., 
visionary leadership, patient-focused excellence, managing by fact, valuing people), the 
Healthcare Criteria for Performance Excellence (Healthcare Criteria) provides the foundation for 
“integrating key performance and operational requirements within a results-oriented framework” 
(Baldridge Performance Excellence Program, 2015).  Applicants assess their organization’s 
operating environment as well as relationships with suppliers, consumers, and other partners (See 
Figure 1.) (Baldridge Performance Excellence Program, 2015). 
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Figure 1. Health Care Criteria for Performance Excellence Overview and Structure. 
  
Using the Healthcare Criteria, Bronze-level applicants make a commitment to quality by 
exploring their vision, mission, and key operational components which may lead to success 
through the development of an organizational profile. The focus of the organizational profile is 
to describe key components of the business, the organizational environment, and organizational 
relationships. At the Bronze-level, the expectation is for NHs to assess their organizational 
processes to identify opportunities for improvement in their delivery of quality care. Applicants 
are deemed to be in the beginning stages of their quality improvement journey and evidence of 
process improvement is not expected. 
Silver-level applicants must complete the organizational profile and describe their 
operations in seven (7) categories: 1) leadership, 2) strategy, 3) customers, 4) measurement, 
analysis, and knowledge management, 5) workforce, 6) operations, and 7) results. To receive a 
Silver-level award, applicants must demonstrate the organization is at least in the beginning 
stages of using systematic process improvement efforts to improve measures the NH has 
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identified as important to their success. The board of examiners assess each application on the 
organization’s approach, deployment of the approach, the presence of learning (refinement of 
efforts through periodic evaluation and improvement of the process), and integration of efforts 
across all processes and work units.   
Finally, Gold-level applicants are required to comply with Bronze and Silver 
requirements and, additionally, demonstrate systematic process improvement efforts have been 
implemented and resulted in improvement. The goal of applicant assessments at all levels is to 
facilitate identification of performance gaps, process inefficiencies, and improve the NHs’ 
competitiveness in their market (Leonard & McGuire, 2007). A brief description of the seven 
categories of the Healthcare Criteria is provided in Appendix A.  
The Healthcare Criteria used to evaluate NQAP applicants stresses a systems-based 
approach to improve operational effectiveness. Therefore, it is expected NQAP awardees should 
achieve higher quality care and experience better financial performance when they win the 
award. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is to determine if NQAP award status is 
associated with better quality and financial performance.  
Conceptual Framework 
Guided by Porter’s product differentiation strategy (Porter, 1998), this dissertation 
examines the impact of NH success in applying Baldridge principles prescribed in the Healthcare 
Criteria and subsequent NQAP award receipt. According to Porter’s product differentiation 
strategy, organizations may employ efforts to create unique products or services to be 
competitive within an industry and set itself apart from competitors (Porter, 1980, 1998). 
Moreover, differentiation can take many forms including branding, customer services and other 
dimensions such as quality. Porter suggests if differentiation is achieved, organizations are better 
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positioned to defend against competitive forces within an industry including competitors (other 
NHs within the same market), potential new entrants (new NHs entering the market), substitutes 
(assisted living, home and community-based services), buyers (Medicare, Medicaid, private pay 
residents), and suppliers (contract care/services provided to serve residents).   
Regulatory mandates provide higher Medicare reimbursements for post-acute care.  
Therefore, providers may seek to differentiate themselves based on quality to attract more post-
acute patients from hospital referrals. From a legislative perspective, public reporting was 
initiated to incentivize NH providers to compete on quality by informing consumers of care 
quality when making a NH selection. Therefore, the current regulatory environment and use of 
public reporting on Nursing Home Compare (NHC) encourages NHs to differentiate their 
services by improving quality. 
The financial viability of the NH industry has been a concern for decades. Prior to the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and repeal of the Boren Amendment, States had control over 
reimbursement rates for Medicaid. However, many states have chosen to withhold Medicaid 
reimbursement rate increases in an effort to resolve budgetary shortfalls creating financial issues 
for NHs with many questioning the sustainability of the industry. Consequently, differentiation 
on quality has become a mechanism for NHs to maintain steady revenue streams and set 
themselves apart from competitors (Bowblis, Lucas, & Brunt, 2015; Weech-Maldonado, Neff, & 
Mor, 2003a; Wiener & Stevenson, 1998).  
Industry-based association memberships, such as AHCA/NCAL, are often a mechanism 
deployed by an organization to differentiate itself against competitors.  Further, participation in a 
trade association often affords members access to both tangible (information, services, products) 
and intangible benefits (e.g., common purpose, networking). Within this dissertation framework, 
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we speculate NHs, which become members of AHCA/NCAL and subsequently apply for and 
successfully receive a NQAP award are doing so in order to differentiate themselves within the 
industry based upon quality.  
New Contribution 
 This research makes several new contributions to the literature by examining whether the 
deployment of the systems-based organizational assessment and utilization of Baldridge 
principles required by the Healthcare Criteria improves process and outcome measures. First, this 
work seeks to build upon previous research in the NH literature, which demonstrates NQAP 
award recipients, when examined cross-sectionally, perform better on most facility-level quality 
indicators and receive fewer regulatory deficiencies (Castle, Olson, Shah, & Hansen, 2016 & 
Hansen, 2016). Therefore, the first study in this dissertation will examine NQAP award 
recipients’ performance on 23 publicly reported quality measures from NHC, a web-based tool 
designed to assist consumers in making informed NH selection choices.  The NHC measures are 
derived from resident-level assessments taken at regular intervals, reported quarterly, and 
provide a more concise picture of quality in the NH setting than annual recertification surveys 
used in prior research examining quality of NQAP award recipients.   
Given NHs dependence on government reimbursement to subsist and the eminent move 
toward value-based payment systems, it is important to investigate mechanisms, which may 
guide quality improvement in the NH setting. Therefore, the second study in this dissertation will 
examine NQAP award recipients’ financial performance at the time of winning. The Baldridge 
principles contained within the Healthcare Criteria drive NHs to define priorities, guide strategic 
development to create action plans, and directly links strategic objectives to outcomes, which are 
deemed important to the organization.  Presumably, a systems-based approach to continuous 
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quality improvement will create a more efficient environment allowing NHs to incur lower costs, 
achieve higher revenues, and ultimately experience better profit margins. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE NATIONAL QUALITY AWARD PROGRAM: IS AWARD STATUS 
ASSOCIATED WITH BETTER PERFORMANCE ON QUALITY MEASURES? 
Introduction 
According to the American Health Care Association (2015), approximately 1.4 million 
people reside in over 15,000 NHs across the country. Despite the efforts of policy makers, 
providers and stakeholders, the quality of NH care has undergone significant criticism and has 
remained an enduring concern. One of the key issues associated with quality improvement is that 
“quality” itself is extremely difficult to define (Castle & Ferguson, 2010). If asked, providers 
may suggest quality means the prevention of medical errors. Consumers may indicate quality 
signifies the absence of a condition, or the promotion of spiritual well-being and regulators may 
believe quality equates to a smaller number or absence of regulatory violations. Regardless, 
one’s vantage point determines what quality means to them. Thus, operationally defining 
“quality” is extremely difficult making measurement a major challenge.  
Historically, the NH certification process has cultivated a compliance culture (Castle & 
Ferguson, 2010). Noteworthy, quality assurance is both retrospective and reactive as providers 
attempt to determine why a standard was not met rather than continuously seeking opportunities 
for improvement. Unfortunately, such an approach has created a fragmented focus on quality 
(i.e., multi-tasking incentive problem) which manifests when one focal area improves and 
another area suffers (Bowblis & Lucas, 2012; Konetzka, Brauner, Shega, & Werner, 2014 Shega, 
& Werner, 2014).  
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The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 2010 (ACA) seeks to broaden the scope of 
NH quality improvement efforts by requiring NHs to focus on performance improvement through 
continual analysis of organizational performance and plans for improvement.  As defined by the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2013), performance improvement entails engaging in 
a proactive process to prevent and/or decrease the likelihood of substandard care.  By identifying 
opportunities for improvement in their processes, NH leadership can detect underlying root causes, 
which lead to systemic problems, so they can be prevented. Consistent monitoring of quality data, 
development of interventions, and utilization of feedback loops are tools NHs may use in their 
performance improvement efforts to determine if interventions are efficacious.  As of November 
2017, certified NHs are required to submit QAPI plans to surveyors during inspections (Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2018b). Undoubtedly, the new regulations will require an 
adjustment in NH leadership’s approach to quality initiatives.   
Association-sponsored award programs such as the NQAP provides educational support and 
fosters a systems-based approach to quality improvement, which may guide NH QAPI efforts.  A 
recent study by Castle and colleagues (2016) examined the performance of NQAP award recipients 
on aggregated facility-level quality indicators (e.g., % of residents physically restrained, % of 
residents receiving antipsychotic medication) and deficiency citations.  Findings demonstrated 
NQAP award recipients achieved higher quality levels on most assessed outcomes and were able to 
sustain the improvement over a four-year period.  Therefore, findings from their study suggest, 
participation in the NQAP and subsequent award receipt may serve as a mechanism for NHs to 
improve quality as prescribed by the ACA.  
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Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Quality of Care in NHs. The quality of NH care has been a topic widely explored. 
Researchers have examined various facets of the NH regulatory and operational environment as 
well as public/private initiatives to determine what elicits higher quality of care.  Despite extensive 
efforts on behalf of legislators, providers, and stakeholders, the formula for delivering consistent, 
high-quality care remains a mystery.   
Multiple studies have examined the impact of regulatory changes on improving quality. For 
example, after the implementation of OBRA ’87, studies suggested processes of care such as 
physical restraint use (Castle, Fogel, & Mor, 1997; Hawes et al., 1997), catheter use (Hawes et al., 
1997; Zhang & Grabowski, 2004), psychotropic drug use (Shorr, Fought, & Ray, 1994), and 
pressure ulcers declined (Fries et al., 1997; Zhang & Grabowski, 2004). Other studies examining 
regulatory deficiencies suggest higher staffing levels are related to lower deficiency citations 
(Harrington, Zimmerman, Karon, Robinson, & Beutel, 2000; Kim, Kovner, Harrington, Greene, & 
Mezey, 2009; Park & Stearns, 2009). These findings were strengthened by Bowblis (2011) and 
Hyer, et al. (2011) who used total deficiency scores (i.e., weighted by scope and severity) to analyze 
the relationship between staffing and deficiencies (Bowblis, 2011b; Hyer et al., 2011).  
Other studies have focused on the stringency of regulations for staffing in relation to quality. 
One study found higher direct care staffing requirements led to higher staffing hours for licensed 
practical nurses (LPNs) and certified nursing assistants (CNAs) and better risk-adjusted urinary 
incontinence and ADL decline (Mukamel et al., 2012). Another study examining the effects of 
quality standards and nurse staffing requirements indicated higher total direct care staffing (RNs, 
LPNs and CNAs combined) lowered the use of feeding tubes but increased the use of physical 
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restraints (Bowblis & Lucas, 2012).  However, NH responsiveness to staffing standards may be 
more likely when non-compliance enforcement is higher (Bowblis, 2011a).  
Mandated public reporting or report cards, also known as the bottom-up approach, have also 
produced mixed results. One study examined publicly reported (e.g., percent of short-stay residents 
who did not have moderate or severe pain, percent of short-stay residents whose walking improved) 
and non-publicly reported quality measures (improved pain and locomotion) for post-acute care 
before and after the implementation of the NHC website (Werner, Konetzka, & Kruse, 2009).  The 
authors found NHs, which improved on publicly reported quality measures also improved on non-
publicly reported measures suggesting a spillover effect of improvement efforts.  Bowblis and 
colleagues (2015)  suggested public reporting of antipsychotic and psychoactive medication reduced 
use; however, the long-term impact was inconclusive. According to Werner and colleagues (2010),  
short stay care quality improved after public reporting and consumers chose NHs with higher 
quality care. Despite somewhat positive findings, other researchers warn  public reporting has the 
ability to widen the gap between low and high quality NHs (Werner et al., 2009) and may 
incentivize NHs to re-hospitalize higher-risk post-acute residents in an effort to improve quality 
scores (Konetzka, Polsky, & Werner, 2013 2012). 
Individual states also have the ability to set mandates which are more stringent than federal 
requirements. Moreover, work by Bowblis (2011)   suggested when states exercise their right to 
mandate higher staffing than the federal minimum, resident outcomes and deficiency citations seem 
to improve. Additionally, a review by Mukamel and colleagues (2014) examined studies conducted 
from 2006 to 2012 on the impact of both top-down (regulatory) and bottom-up (report card) 
approaches to quality improvement and suggested the top-down approach may be more effective.  
Therefore, some improvement in indicators of quality of care have been identified. However, due to 
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inconsistent outcomes across all quality metrics, the regulatory approach to improvement is moving 
towards a focus on continual performance improvement rather than simply quality assurance. 
Various studies have also examined the operational environment within NHs.  For example, 
studies have demonstrated a relationship between quality and staffing levels including usage and 
turnover (e.g., Castle & Anderson, 2011; Castle, Engberg, & Men, 2007; Hyer et al., 2011; Weech-
Maldonado, Meret-Hanke, Neff, & Mor, 2004), ownership and profit status (e.g., Davis, 1993; 
O'Neill, Harrington, Kitchener, & Saliba, 2003; Weech-Maldonado et al., 2012) as well as market 
factors (e.g., Starkey, Weech-Maldonado, & Mor, 2005; Weech-Maldonado, Zinn, & Brannon, 
1999). Larger facilities, chain members and those with a higher census have been linked to a higher 
number of regulatory deficiencies (Castle, 2001). Other studies have looked at the role state policies 
play relative to incentives and reimbursement based on resident outcomes (Grabowski, 2001; Hyer, 
Thomas, Johnson, Harman, & Weech-Maldonado, 2013; Mor et al., 2011). Leadership style has 
also been shown to be associated with better quality of care (Castle & Decker, 2011). NH 
administrator level of education associated with restraint use, catheter use, inadequate pain 
management, low and high-risk residents with pressure ulcers (Castle, Furnier, Ferguson-Rome, 
Olson, & Johs-Artisensi, 2015 Olson, Johs-Artisensi, 2015). 
Other work has explored the efficacy of quality improvement interventions and payment 
incentives. For example, Rantz and colleagues (2012) tested the efficacy of a two-year intervention 
in NHs relative to “outcomes measures with room for improvement”.  Findings demonstrated 
positive impacts on pressure ulcers and weight loss (Rantz et al., 2012).  Another study examined 
the impact of the Reduce Acute Care Transfers II which consists of tools and strategies which aid 
NH staff in “early identification, assessment, communication, and documentation about changes in 
residents status which was associated with improved hospitalization rates (Ouslander et al., 2011). 
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Pay for performance incentives caused high performing NHs to lower performance and only those 
performing at the lowest levels improved (Werner, Skira, & Konetzka, 2010). 
Voluntary public reporting (Mukamel, Ye, Glance, & Li, 2015 & Li, 2015) and voluntary 
association accreditation (Wagner, McDonald, & Castle, 2013 2013) have been shown to be related 
to better quality outcomes.  Despite these positive findings, a report by the Kaiser Family 
Foundation (2015), suggests approximately 39% of all NH residents still receive suboptimal care in 
NHs. Recent work by Castle and colleagues (2016) examined award recipients of NQAP, the 
association-sponsored award and subject of this dissertation work.  Findings demonstrated 
improvement on facility-level aggregated quality indicators (e.g., deficiency citations, antipsychotic 
medication use) among NQAP award recipients. Their work is the first to assess the quality of the 
NQAP award recipients compared to other NHs.  
Based upon findings from the work of Castle and colleagues (2016), it is reasonable to 
expect NQAP awardees to also demonstrate better performance on other measures of quality. 
Therefore, the current study examined the relationship between receipt of a NQAP award and 
quality performance as measured by 23 quality measures publicly reported on NHC.  We 
hypothesized deployment of Baldridge principles used in the Healthcare Criteria would be 
associated with better quality outcomes among NQAP award recipients when compared to similarly 
constructed control groups at the time of award receipt.  
Method: Data and Research Design  
To examine the relationship between receipt of a NQAP award and publicly reported quality 
measures, four sources of data were merged for 2007-2015. First, an analytic database from the 
American Health Care Association National Center of Assisted Living (AHCA/NCAL Analytic 
Database) was utilized. The AHCA/NCAL Analytic Database consists of key variables from the 
Online Survey Certification and Reporting Database (2008-2012), the Certification and Survey 
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Provider Enhanced Reporting Database (2012-2015), average total deficiency scores by state, and 
identification of NQAP award recipients (2010-2015). Variables, excluding award recipient 
information and average deficiency scores by state, consisted of widely-utilized facility-level 
characteristics (e.g., operational characteristics, staffing, deficiency citations) derived from 
inspections which occur every nine to fifteen months and are mandated for recertification to receive 
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement (Office of the Inspector General, 2001). Next, the AHCA 
Analytic Database was merged with data from ltcfocus.org (LTCF, 2017). The LTCF data is a 
publicly available product maintained at Brown University Center for Gerontology and Healthcare 
Research. The data allows researchers to examine various resident and facility characteristics in 
order to carry out research in long-term care settings (Brown University, 2016). The LTCF Data 
were utilized for aggregated facility-level resident care requirements and an aggregated county-level 
measure of market concentration.  Third, the Area Health Resource File contains publicly available 
demographic information maintained by the U.S. Health Resources and Services Administration 
and consists of national county-level data on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of 
markets where NHs operate. Finally, data from NHC, a web-based report card developed to assist 
consumers in making informed decisions about NH placement, was utilized.  Quality measures used 
in NHC have been tested and found to be valid and reliable (Morris et al., 2003) with numerous 
studies utilizing them to assess NH quality of care (e.g.,  Backhaus, Verbeek, van Rossum, 
Capezuti, & Hamers, 2014; Bowblis & Lucas, 2012; Konetzka et al., 2014). 
These data sources were merged to create a dataset from 2010-2015 with a three-year 
lookback to compare NQAP award recipients and annually constructed control groups of NHs, 
which met the eligibility requirements to apply for a NQAP award. Construction of the annual 
control groups is described below.  
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Measures 
 Dependent Variables. Twenty-three (23) publicly reported NHC quality measures for both 
short and long-stay residents were examined.  Operational definitions of the individual measures are 
contained in Table 1.   Quality measures included in the subsequent analyses were based upon data 
availability during the study period of interest.   
Table 1. Operational Definitions of Dependent Variables  
Variable Definition 
Short Stay Measures  
Antipsychotic medication % of short-stay residents who newly received an antipsychotic 
medication 
Delirium % of short-stay residents experiencing delirium 
Pain % of short-stay residents who self-report moderate to severe pain 
Pressure ulcers % of short-stay residents with pressure ulcers that are new or have 
worsened 
Influenza vaccination1 % of short-stay residents assessed and given, appropriately, an influenza 
vaccine 
Pneumonia vaccination1 % of short-stay residents assessed and given, appropriately, the 
pneumococcal vaccine 
Functional improvement1 % of short-stay residents who made improvements in function 
  
Long Stay Measures  
ADL decline % of long-stay residents whose need for help with daily activities 
increased 
Antipsychotic medication % of long-stay residents who received an antipsychotic medication 
Anti-anxiety/hypnotic 
medication 
% of long-stay residents who received an antianxiety or hypnotic 
medication 
Bedfast % of long-stay residents who are bedfast 
Bowel/bladder incontinence  % of long-stay low-risk residents who lose control of their bowels or 
bladder 
Catheterization  % of long-stay residents with an indwelling catheter  
Depression % of long-stay residents who have depressive symptoms 
Falls % of long-stay residents who have experienced one or more falls with 
major injury 
Locomotion % of long-stay residents whose ability to move independently worsened  
Pain % of long-stay residents who self-report moderate to severe pain 
Physical restraints    % of long-stay residents who were physically restrained 
Pressure ulcers  % of long-stay high-risk residents with pressure ulcers 
Urinary tract infection % of long-stay residents with a urinary tract infection 
Weight loss % of long-stay residents who lose too much weight 
Influenza vaccination1 % of long-stay residents assessed and given, appropriately, an influenza 
vaccine 
Pneumonia vaccination1 % of long-stay residents assessed and given, appropriately, the 
pneumococcal vaccine 
NOTE: 1- higher percentages signify better quality 
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Independent Variables. A dichotomous independent variable, awardee, was created from the 
AHCA analytic database and utilized to evaluate the relationship between receipt of a NQAP award 
at the Silver or Gold level (0=no award; 1=award at the Silver or Gold level) and NH quality. NHs 
at the Bronze level are deemed to be just beginning their quality journey and are not required to 
demonstrate use of systematic processes to improve quality. Similar to the work of Castle and 
colleagues (2016), the subsequent analysis includes only Silver and Gold level awardees. Bronze 
level awardees were however eligible for inclusion in the annually constructed control groups.   
Covariates. Sixteen control variables deemed to have an influence on the quality of NH care 
were included.  First, to account for resident case mix and individual needs of NH residents, we 
controlled for resident acuity. Created by the Cowles Group (Cowles, 2002), the acuity index 
combines unique treatment needs of NH residents and activities of daily living dependencies on a 
scale ranging from 0 (low need) to 38 (high need). Derived from the OSCAR/CASPER data, the 
acuity index is widely utilized in NH quality literature (Grabowski et al., 2016 et al., 2017; Hyer et 
al., 2011 Harman, et al., 2011). We also controlled for the percentage of NH residents with a 
psychiatric diagnosis as previous research suggests individuals with psychiatric related needs are 
often admitted to lower quality NHs (Li, Cai, & Cram, 2013).  
Facility characteristics deemed to have an impact on quality were also included. Previous 
research has suggested larger facilities may have the ability to restructure staffing resources, 
potentially influencing quality. To account for this, a measure of size, total number of beds was 
included.  Additionally, the occupancy rate of a NH is commonly utilized as a proxy measure for 
performance (Zinn, Mor, Feng, & Intrator, 2009). Therefore, occupancy was also included. Profit 
status is also associated with quality and previous findings have suggested for-profit NHs deliver 
poorer quality of care than their nonprofit counterparts (Hillmer, Wodchis, Gill, Anderson, & 
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Rochon, 2005). Therefore, we controlled for profit status (0=no, 1=yes).  Chain affiliation has been 
shown to be related to quality (e.g., Banaszak-Holl, Berta, Bowman, Baum, & Mitchell, 2002; 
Castle & Fogel, 1998; Harrington, Woolhandler, Mullan, Carrillo, & Himmelstein, 2001), albeit 
findings have been mixed. Therefore, the variable chain membership (0=no, 1=yes) was controlled 
for. We also controlled for whether or not a NH was situated in a metropolitan area (0=no; 1=yes) 
given NHs which operate in urban areas may have access to better staffing pools and may 
fundamentally address quality concerns differently. Payer source has also been found to be 
associated with NH quality.  For example, research suggests a higher proportion of Medicaid 
residents is associated with lower quality (Mor, Zinn, Angelelli, Teno, & Miller, 2004) while a 
higher proportion of Medicare is associated with higher quality (Kim, Harrington, & Greene, 2009); 
therefore, we control for the proportion of Medicaid resident and the proportion of Medicare 
residents. A plethora of studies have demonstrated a relationship between direct care staffing levels 
and the quality of care (Castle, 2008; Harrington, Kovner, et al., 2000; Harrington, Olney, Carrillo, 
& Kang, 2012; Hyer et al., 2011).  Therefore, three staffing measures were also controlled for 
including RN total hours per resident day (RN HPRD), LPN total hours per resident day (LPN 
HPRD), and CNA total hours per resident day (CNA HPRD). For example, RN staffing hours per 
resident day was calculated as 𝑅𝑁 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝐷 = (((𝑅𝑁𝐹𝑇 + 𝑅𝑁𝑃𝑇) ∗ 2080)/365)/𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠).  
The same method was repeated to calculate LPN HPRD and CNA HPRD. 
Previous research examining quality suggests the market structure and operating 
environment within which a NH operates has the potential to influence quality strategies. Therefore, 
we included a measure of market concentration, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, as well as the 
number of adults 65+ within the county, and per capita income by county as covariates in our final 
models (Castle et al., 2016 & Hansen, 2016; Hyer et al., 2013; Hyer et al., 2011).  We also 
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controlled for the number of home health agencies within the county the NH operates. Home health 
agencies provide a substitution for NH care and may be an option for residents who require lower 
care absent quality NH options.  
Previous work has suggested states may differ on the deficiencies they emphasize during the 
survey process (Castle & Ferguson, 2010).  Therefore, we constructed 47 state dummy variables 
(0=no; 1=yes) to control for state variation in the survey certification process, using Alabama as the 
reference group. Finally, six dummy variables were created for time signifying which year the 
sample was being evaluated in (e.g., Sample_2010, Sample_2011). Operational definitions of 
covariates utilized in subsequent analyses are contained within Table 2.  
Table 2. Operational Definitions of Covariates. 
Variable Definition 
Acuity index Level of resident care required 
Psychiatric diagnosis % of residents with psychiatric diagnosis 
Total beds Total number of beds 
Occupancy Number of residents/number of beds 
Profit Status For profit status (0=no; 1=yes) 
Chain Membership Member of a chain (0=no; 1=yes) 
Medicaid Proportion of Medicaid residents 
Medicare Proportion of Medicare residents 
CNA HPRD  Hours per resident day of certified nursing assistant time 
LPN HPRD  Hours per resident day of licensed nurse time 
RN HPRD Hours per resident day of registered nurse time 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Measure of market concentration 
Home health agencies # of home health agencies by county 
Metro Located in a metropolitan area (0=no; 1=yes) 
Per capita income Per capita income by county/$1,000 
Population 65+ Proportion of population over 65 by county 
Sample_(Year) Time dummy variables signifying year of study period (2010-2015) 
State 47 state dummy variables (0=no; 1=yes) 
 
Sample Construction. Annually constructed control groups were created, based upon 
eligibility to apply for the NQAP award, to examine the association between winning a NQAP 
award and performance on 23 publicly reported NHC quality measures. Key variables in the AHCA 
analytic database were analyzed to determine eligibility for inclusion in the control groups by 
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examination of non-compliance with approximately 180 regulatory standards. Deficiency citations 
resulting from non-compliance were then assessed on two dimensions including scope (how many 
residents are affected) and severity (likelihood of harming residents).  Scope is trichotomized into 
isolated, a pattern, or a widespread practice. Severity has four categories (no harm, no harm and 
potential for minimal harm, actual harm, and immediate jeopardy requiring immediate corrective 
action).  
Within this study, total deficiency scores were calculated pursuant to the methodology 
utilized by AHCA/NCAL for the NQAP by assigning points for individual deficiencies and their 
respective scope/severity (A-M).  Explicitly points were assigned as follows: A=1, B=2, C=3, D=4, 
E=5, F=6, G=7, H=8, I=9, J=10, K=11, L=12, M=13.  Then, all NHs, which had a deficiency with a 
scope/severity above “I”, were removed from the sample. 
Finally, NHs with three consecutive total deficiency survey scores with less than their 
respective state’s average score were eligible for inclusion in the control group. For example, when 
constructing the control group for comparison to award winners in 2010, data from annual surveys 
from 2007-2009 were used and total deficiency scores were calculated.  If a NH’s total deficiency 
score was lower than their state’s average for each of the years within the lookback period (2007-
2009), the NH was included in the control group for 2010. This process was repeated for each year 
of the study period.   
The number of awardees varied across the study period creating a non-stationary panel 
dataset.  Award recipients were excluded from the control groups regardless of the year being 
analyzed.  Final count information on the NQAP award recipients and annually constructed control 
groups can be found in Table 3.   
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Table 3. Annually Constructed Control Group Counts 
 
Year 
Award Recipients 
Silver              Gold 
 
Control Group 
2010 36 1 5,333 
2011 29 1 7,680 
2012 46 2 7,353 
2013 51 4 7,886 
2014 75 3  8,308 
2015 99 3 6,277  
 
Data on all freestanding NHs in the lower 48 states was used.  Given hospital-based NHs 
receive higher reimbursement and are able to staff at higher levels (Harrington et al., 2001), 
resource differences may influence the quality of care delivered.  Additionally, NHs with less than 
30 beds or more than 800 beds were also omitted from the control group due to operational 
differences (Castle et al., 2016 & Hansen, 2017 ) Additionally, staffing outliers were trimmed 
pursuant to guidelines by Harrington and colleagues (Harrington et al., 2012), and NHs with greater 
than 24 hours per resident day and total staffing greater than three standard deviations above the 
mean were considered outliers and removed from the sample.  From 2010 to 2015, there were 396 
NQAP award recipients at the Silver or Gold level.  Of those, six could not be merged by the 
provider identification provided, eight were hospital based and excluded, and 32 were removed due 
to other data cleaning (staffing, total beds).  Therefore, a final sample of 351 NQAP awardees were 
utilized in subsequent analyses and overall data cleaning resulted in removal of 1052 observations, 
which represented less than 1% of the total sample. The final data set consisted of 43,538 
observations. 
Analyses  
The empirical model utilized estimates the relationship between receipt of a NQAP award 
and 23 publicly reported NHC quality measures.  Using the NH year as the unit of analysis, pooled 
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ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses were deployed and modeled as follows for each of 
the 23 outcome measures:    
𝑄𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑊𝑖𝑡𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where QM is equal to the actual value of the dependent variable (e.g., percentage of long-
stay residents with a pressure ulcer, percentage of long stay residents who have received an 
antipsychotic medication), W represents a dichotomous variable signifying receipt of a NQAP 
award (0=no; 1=yes), X represents a series of county-level control variables (e.g. Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index, per capita income), and δi   represents a series of time-invariant facility-level fixed 
effects (e.g., profit status, chain membership).  Finally,  τ represents a set of time dummy variables 
(e.g., sample2010, sample2011…sample2015) to signify the year of analysis, and  ε represents error 
within the model.  As specified, the model assumes the effect of winning the award, W, and that the 
individual covariates added into the model are stable over the study period.   
Given the nonstationary sample of NQAP recipients and annually constructed control groups 
across the study period, OLS pooled regression is more efficient and produces coefficients which 
depict the average relationship between the dependent and independent variables over the cross 
sections within the study period (Phillips & Moon, 1999).  A Hausman specificity test verified the 
method was appropriate (Hausman, 1978).   
Results 
During the study period (2010-2015), there were 351 NQAP awardees at the Silver and Gold 
level, which received an award at the Silver or Gold level.  Annually constructed control groups 
based upon NQAP award eligibility ranged from 5,333 to 8,308 thousand per annum.  There were 
12,493 unique NHs included in the annually constructed control groups and inclusion was not 
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restricted by year.  Therefore, NHs could serve as controls during multiple years across the study 
period. Specific counts of the annually constructed control groups are provided in Table 3.   
Within the study sample, award recipients were mostly for-profit (85%), members of a chain 
(83%) and located in a metropolitan area (77%). On average, NQAP award recipients had lower 
average deficiency scores (M=29.09, SD=8.89) than the annually constructed control groups 
(M=29.84, SD=9.01) and the national sample (M=31.44, SD=40.27). Descriptive statistics for award 
recipients, annually constructed control groups, and national comparison data are provided in Table 
4.      
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Table 4.  Study 1 Descriptive Statistics  
   Group Mean Comparison 
 National 
(n= 15,120) 
NQAP Awardees 
(n=351) 
Control  
(n= 43,187)1 
 
95%  
 
t 
(χ2) 
 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD CI Df 
Dependent Variables          
Short-Stay Measures          
Antipsychotic medication  3.92 7.80 4.10 7.70 3.75 7.86 -1.30, .61 -.71 28706 
Delirium  1.29 2.49 1.10 1.65 1.23 2.54 -.44, .70 .46 35.33 
Influenza vaccination  82.66 17.80 83.10 16.84 83.01 17.30 -2.31, 2.13 -.08 31000 
Locomotion   11.74 6.57 12.91 4.92 10.79 5.60 -2.12, -4.00 -2.20* 4452 
Pain   19.36 11.90 18.10 11.33 19.36 11.74 -.06, 2.57 1.87 34456 
Pressure ulcers  4.06 6.98 3.48 6.38 3.50 6.74 -.71, .78 .09 36584 
Pneumonia vaccination  91.48 13.30 80.32 19.59 80.38 20.28 -2.18, 2.30 .05 37232 
Long-Stay Measures          
ADL decline 20.12 26.01 16.59 12.66 20.43 28.82 2.42, 5.28 5.28* 340.36 
Antipsychotic medication 21.89 11.14 19.28 9.49 21.05 10.85 .66, 2.89 3.12*** 287.23 
Antianxiety/hypnotic 
medication 
23.88 13.13 22.48 12.62 23.72 13.14 -1.60, 4.10 .87 80.71 
Bedfast 3.78 4.84 3.01 2.52 3.92 5.07 -.03, 1.67 1.96* 38.169 
Bowel/Bladder incontinence  44.57 19.25 44.69 19.45 44.48 19.26 -.20, -2.61 -.17 26009 
Catheterization  4.46 4.88 4.06 4.20 4.39 4.88 -.14, .79 1.39 323.04 
Depression 10.59 19.76 6.70 8.82 9.25 19.40 1.57, 3.54 5.08*** 343.65 
Falls 4.09 4.67 4.28 5.22 3.98 4.56 -.90, .32 -.94 385.59 
Influenza vaccination 92.74 10.78 93.66 8.49 92.76 10.64 -1.98, .18 -1.63 245.35 
Move independently  21.81 16.64 21.42 14.91 21.77 17.16 -3.51, 4.21 .18 4908 
Pain 8.52 8.23 6.79 6.17 8.78 8.23 1.29, 2.69 5.59*** 314.23 
Physical Restraints    2.60 5.39 2.57 5.58 2.58 5.48 0.59, .61 .03 39454 
Pneumonia vaccination 91.48 13.30 90.58 12.60 91.69 13.06 -.33, 2.54 1.51 39579 
Pressure ulcers  8.23 8.02 6.59 5.72 7.83 8.03 .59, 1.88 3.74** 313.85 
Urinary tract infection 7.53 6.04 6.74 5.95 7.32 6.04 -.08, 1.25 1.71 39334 
Weight loss 7.83 6.04 8.11 5.46 7.87 5.29 -.83,.34 -.82 39207 
Covariates          
Acuity index 11.68 1.47 12.04 1.09 11.88 1.53 -.28, -.05 -2.85* 358.18 
Average deficiency score1 31.44 40.27 29.09 8.89 29.84 9.01 -.15, -.05 -4.13*** 303.54 
Psychiatric diagnosis (%) .30 .19 .29 .17 .29 .19 -.01, .03 1.03 355.99 
Total beds 116.06 62.69 114.45 47.30 113.08 60.64 -6.35, 3.66 -.53 358.44 
Occupancy .82 .16 .87 .11 .83 .15 -5.53, -3.29 -7.74*** 360.13 
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Table 4.  Study 1 Descriptive Statistics Continued  
   Group Mean Comparison 
 National 
(n= 15,120) 
NQAP Awardees 
(n=351) 
Control  
(n= 43,187)1 
 
95%  
 
t 
(χ2) 
 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD CI Df 
          
Profit Status 73% --- 85% --- 70% --- --- 38.68*** 1 
Chain Membership 55% --- 83% --- 57% --- --- 98.94*** 1 
Medicaid .61 .21 .61 .17 .61 .21 -2.19, 1.42 -.42*** 357.63 
Medicare .14 .12 .17 .12 .14 .12 -4.47, -1.99 -5.11 43185 
CNA HPRD2 2.55 .74 2.57 .55 2.56 .73 -.07, 0.05 -.34 359.01 
LPN HPRD2 .91 .39 .83 .32 .91 .38 .05,.11 4.60*** 356.74 
RN HPRD2 .48 .34 .57 .31 .50 .33 -.10, -.03 -3.74** 43185 
Herfindahl Index .62 .33 .28 .31 .27 .30 -.01, -05 -.90 42564 
Home health agencies 3.75  24.45 22.83   86.83 26.83 95.21 -4.80, 13.73 .95 355.86 
Metro 28% --- 77% --- 64% --- --- 2.22 1 
Per capita income 37,614.81 10,086.88 41,917.90  12,426.07 41,823.29  11,819.46 -1.33,1.16 -0.14 43009 
Population 65+ 13,738.74 39,211.63 61,694.25  135,325.33 71,627.61 156,002.00 -2.56, 26.08 1.62 356.7 
Note: 1 Control group n represents # of observations across the study period (NHs could have served as controls in multiple years); 2 HPRD=hours per resident 
day;   
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Due to data availability, OLS regression was performed on 19 of the 23 outcome measures 
of interest. Findings partially support our hypothesis that recipients of a NQAP award would 
perform better on publicly reported NHC quality measures when compared to annual control groups 
which qualify for award eligibility within the same year. Of the 19 outcome measures, four models 
were statistically significant.  Indwelling catheters (R2=.14, F(68,31287)=72.15, p<.0001), self-
reported moderate to severe pain (R2=.19, F(68,29491)=105.97, p<.0001), pressure ulcers among 
residents at high risk (R2=.11, F(67,27371)=65.74, p<.0001), and urinary tract infections (R2=.14, 
F(68,31568)=58.35, p<.0001) were associated with receiving a NQAP award. 
The analysis demonstrates award receipt is associated with a .97 percentage point (PP) 
decrease in the use of indwelling catheters (β=-.97, p<.05). Staffing levels of CNAs (β =-.13, p<.05) 
also impacted the relationship with one additional hour of CNA time being significantly related to a 
.13 PP decline in catheter use. Conversely, LPN (β=.60, p<.0001) and RN (β =.88, p<.0001) 
staffing were significantly associated with higher catheter use, a .60 PP and .88 PP increase 
respectively.  For-profit status (β=.19, p<.05) and a higher percentage of Medicare residents (β =.03, 
p<.0001) was also associated with increased catheter use, a .19 PP and .03 PP respectively in the 
percentage of NH residents with an indwelling catheter.  
Relative to the self-reported moderate to severe pain measure, our regression model 
illustrated a significant association between award receipt (β =-2.09, p<.0001) and a 2.09 PP 
decrease in the pain measure.  Other factors deemed to be related to better pain measures include 
being a nonprofit NH (β=-.53, p<.0001) and CNA HPRD (β=-.14, p=.05).  In contrast, LPN (β =.72, 
p<.0001) and RN (β =.66, p<.001) staffing as well as a higher percentage of Medicaid (β =.01, 
p<.0001) were associated with increased reporting of pain among our sample. 
27 
 
Model results indicate a 1.93 PP decrease in pressure ulcers for NQAP award recipients (β=-
1.93, p<.001).  Similar to other measures, higher CNA (β =-.36, p<.0001) staffing was associated 
with a .36 PP decline in pressure ulcers, while LPN (β=.33, p<.05) staffing was associated with a 
.33 PP increase.  Higher proportions of both Medicare (β=.05, p<.0001) and Medicaid (β=.02, 
p<.0001) were associated with a small, yet statistically significant increase in pressure ulcers, .05 
PP and .02 PP respectively.  
Finally, a decline in urinary tract infections by 1.11PP was associated with NQAP award 
receipt (β=-1.11, p<.05). Other variables which significantly affected and were associated with a 
better performance on quality on the pressure ulcer measure included chain membership (β=.49, 
p<.0001) and the percentage of Medicaid residents (β=-.02, p. <0001). 
While the other outcomes of interest were not statistically significant, the relationships were 
in the expected direction and many were approaching significance. Parameter estimates for 
regression model coefficients are provided in Table 5 for short-stay measures and Table 6 for long-
stay measures including covariates. Each regression also included time and state dummy variables.  
Due to size, coefficients for time and state dummy variables are provided in Appendix B (short stay 
measures) and Appendix C (long-stay measures). 
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Table 5.  Pooled OLS Regression Results Examining Short-Stay Quality Measures of Silver and Gold Awardees (2010-2015)1 
 Antipsychotic 
Medication 
Influenza  
Vaccination 
 
Pain 
Pressure  
Ulcers 
Pneumonia  
Vaccination 
  
Coefficient 
 
S.E.  
 
Coefficie
nt 
 
S.E.  
 
Coefficient 
 
S.E. 
 
Coefficie
nt 
 
S.E. 
 
Coefficient 
 
S.E. 
Win=12 -.25  (.60) .28 (1.31) -1.01 (.76) -.55  (.40) 1.29 (1.23) 
Acuity index -.05  (.04) -.11 (.08) -.12 (.05)* .05  (.03)* .11 (.08) 
Psychiatric dx (%) 3.14  (.36)*** -3.02 (.67)*** .64 (.44) .64  (.22)* -2.80 (.68)*** 
Total beds -.00 (.00)*** -.01 (.00)*** -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00)* -.00 (.00)* 
Occupancy -.00 (.00) .02 (.01)* -.02 (.01)* -.00 (.00) .04 (.01)*** 
Profit status .14 (.14) -1.87 (.27)*** .14 (.17) -.20 (.08)* -1.81 (.27)*** 
Chain   -.43 (.12)** -2.39 (.23)*** -.00 (.15) -.40 (.08)*** -1.71 (.24)*** 
Medicaid .02 (.00)*** -.11 (.00)*** .04 (.00)*** .01 (.00)* -.15 (.01)*** 
Medicare -.03 (.01)*** .04 (.01)* .00 (.00)*** -.01 (.00)* .10 (.01)*** 
CNA HPRD3 -.16 (.09) 1.55 (.17)*** -.52 (.11)*** -.07 (.05) 1.66 (.17)*** 
LPN HPRD3 -.18 (.17) -.32 (.34) 2.29 (.22)*** .08 (.11) .02 (.34) 
RN HPRD3 -.15 (.22) .90 (.43)* 1.89 (.27)*** -.08 (.14) 2.03 (.43)*** 
Herfindahl Index .23 (.37) 5.04 (.69)*** -.78 (.45) .64 (.23)* 3.66 (.69)*** 
HHA4 .00 (.00) -.01 (.00)*** -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) -.01 (.00)*** 
Metro -.16 (.17) -2.07 (.32)*** .30 (.21) -.05 (.11) -2.29 (.33)*** 
Per capita income .01 (.01) -.05 (.01)** -.06 (.00)*** .00 (.00) -.06 (.01)*** 
Population 65+ .00 (.00) -.00 (.00)* -.01 (.00)*** .00 (.00) -.00 (.00) 
Intercept 9.53  (.96)*** 90.66 (3.08)**
* 
16.51 (1.19)*** 6.27 (.62)*** 71.42 (1.87)*** 
Notes: *=p-value<.05**= p=value<.001; ***=p-value  <.0001; 1 supplemental coefficient reporting for time and state dummy variables contained in Appendix B; 2 coefficients 
reported for NQAP award winners only; 3 HPRD=hours per resident day; 4 HHA=Home Health Agencies   
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Table 6.  Pooled OLS Regression Results Examining Long-Stay Quality Measures of Silver and Gold Awardees (2010-2015)1 
  
ADL Decline 
Antipsychotic  
Medication 
 
Falls 
 
Incontinence 
 
UTI 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient  S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Win=12 -1.03 (1.90) -.73 (.69) -.30 (.33) -.10 (1.28) -1.11 (.39)* 
Acuity index 0.25 (0.12)* - .70 (.05)*** -.05 (.17)** 2.42 (.09)*** .28 (.03)*** 
Psychiatric dx (%) -.75 (.98) 20.75 (.37)*** .50 (.17)** -8.65 (.71)*** -.17 (.20) 
Total beds -.09 (.00)*** .00 (.00) -.00 (.00) .01 (.00)*** -.00  (.00)*** 
Occupancy -.37 (.01)*** -.02 (.01)*** .00 (.00) .03 (.01) -.01  (.00)*** 
Profit status -1.11 (.40)** .75 (.15)*** -.21 (.07)* -1.85 (.30)*** -0.02 (.08) 
Chain      -2.37 (0.36)*** -.43 (.13) ** .01 (.06) 1.28 (.26)*** -.49  (.07)*** 
Medicaid -.06 (.01)*** .06 (.00)*** -.02 (.00)*** -.12 (.01)*** -.02  (.00)*** 
Medicare .30 (.02)*** -.02 (.00)* .00 (.00) .03 (.02) .05  (.00)*** 
CNA HPRD3 0.26 (.26) -.13 (.10) .07 (.04) .60 (.20)* .29 (.05)*** 
LPN HPRD3 2.08 (.53)*** -.69 (.19)** -.10 (.09) 1.09 (.39)* .43  (.11)*** 
RN HPRD3 5.50 (.69)*** -1.85 (.25)*** -.01 (.12) 2.52 (.54)*** -.13 (.14) 
Herfindahl Index 1.85 (1.00) -.02 (.37) .35 (.17)* -3.49 (.76)*** .90  (.21)*** 
HHA4 -.01 (.03) .00 (.00)*** -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00)* 
Metro .15 (.48) .52 (.18) * -.25 (.08) 1.27 (.36)** .27  (.10)* 
Income .07 (.02)** -0.02 (.01)*** -.00 (.00) .00 (.01) -.02  (.00)** 
Population 65+ .00 (.00) .00 (.00) -.00 (.00) .00 (.00) -.00 (.00) 
Intercept 54.74 (2.84)*** 25.11 (1.04)*** 9.63 (.48)*** 3.94 (2.18) 7.49  (.59)*** 
Notes: *=p-value<.05**= p=value<.001; ***=p-value  <.0001; 1 supplemental coefficient reporting for time and state dummy variables contained in Appendix B; 2 coefficients 
reported for NQAP award winners only; 3 HPRD=hours per resident day; 4 HHA=Home Health Agencies   
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Table 6. Pooled OLS Regression Results Examining Long-Stay Quality Measures of Silver and Gold Awardees (2010-2015) Continued1 
 Weight 
Loss 
Pressure  
Ulcers 
Physical  
Restraints 
 
Catheter 
 
Depression 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Win=12 -.34 (.35) -1.92  (.54)** -.58  (.36) -.97  (.32)* -1.38  (1.26) 
Acuity index .13 (.02)*** .10  (.04)* .20  (.02)*** .13 (.02)*** -.29 (.08)** 
Psychiatric dx (%) -.26  (.18) .67 (.31)* .77  (.19)*** -.21 (.17) 4.08  (.64)*** 
Total beds -.00 (.00) -.00  (.00)*** -.00 (.00) .00 (.00) -.03  (.00)*** 
Occupancy -.00  (.00)** -.05  (.00)*** -.00 (.00) -.01  (.00)*** -.15  (.01)*** 
Profit status -0.06  (.07) .32  (.12)* .04  (.08) .20 (.07)** .21 (.27) 
Chain   .05 (.07) -.32 (.11)* -.21 (.07) * -.03  (.06) -1.78 (.23)*** 
Medicaid -0.02  (.00)*** .02  (.00)*** .01  (.00)*** -.00 (.00) -.03 (.01)*** 
Medicare .04 (.00)*** .05  (.01)*** .02 (.00)*** .04 (.00)*** .08 (.01)*** 
CNA HPRD3 .11  (.05)* -.37 (.08)*** .05  (.05) -.13 (.04)* .26 (.17) 
LPN HPRD3 -.03  (.10) .37  (.16)* .27  (.10)* .60 (.09)*** .28  (.35) 
RN HPRD3 -.24  (.13) .31 (.21) .11  (.13) .88  (.12)*** 1.63  (.45)** 
Herfindahl Index .29  (.18) -.11  (.31) .52 (.19)* .40 (.17)* 1.71  (.66)* 
HHA4 .00 (.00) .00  (.00) -.00 (.00)* .00  (.00) -.01 (.00)** 
Metro .06 (.08) .19  (.15) -.01 (.09) -.05  (.08) .04 (.32) 
Income .00  (.00) -.00 (.01) -.01  (.00)*** -.12  (.00)*** .01 (.01) 
Population 65+ -.00 (.00)* .00  (.00)** .00  (.00)* -.00  (.00) .00  (.00)* 
Intercept 11.32 (.52)*** 14.68 (.88)*** 3.78 (.53)*** 6.27 (.48)*** 23.19 (1.85)**
* 
Notes: *=p-value<.05**= p=value<.001; ***=p-value  <.0001; 1 supplemental coefficient reporting for time and state dummy variables contained in Appendix B; 2 coefficients 
reported for NQAP award winners only; 3 HPRD=hours per resident day; 4 HHA=Home Health Agencies   
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Table 6. Pooled OLS Regression Results Examining Long-Stay Quality Measures of Silver and Gold Awardees (2010-2015) Continued1 
 Anxiety/Hypnotic 
Medication 
 
Pain 
Influenza  
Vaccination 
Pneumonia  
Vaccination 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Win=12 -2.21  (1.48) -2.09  (.52)*** 1.23 (.82) 1.04  (.76) 
Acuity index -.16 (.16) .05 (.03) -.12 (.05)* .04  (.05) 
Psychiatric dx (%) 15.49 (1.06)*** .65 (.27)* 1.15 (.38)* 1.37  (.39)** 
Total beds -.00 (.00)* -.00 (.00)*** -.01  (.00)*** -.01  (.00)*** 
Occupancy -.00 (.02) -.01 (.00)** .01  (.01) .03 (.01)*** 
Profit status .16 (.43) -.54 (.11)*** -.96 (.16)*** -1.48 (.16)*** 
Chain   .33 (.39) .23 (.10)* -1.58  (.14)*** -1.39  (.14)*** 
Medicaid .01 (.01) .01 (.00)*** -.01 (.00)* -.03  (.00)*** 
Medicare .08 (.02)** .01  (01) -.04  (.00)*** -.02 (.01)* 
CNA HPRD3 .05  (.28) -.14 (.07)* .72  (.10)*** .93  (.10)*** 
LPN HPRD3 .87  (.55) .72  (.15)*** -.72 (.20)** -.65  (.21)* 
RN HPRD3 3.01  (.68)*** .67  (.19) ** -.22  (.27) .43 (.27) 
Herfindahl Index .13  (1.12) -.04 (.28) 2.66 (.38)*** 2.18 (.40)*** 
HHA4 .00 (.00) -.00 (.00)* -.00 (.00)*** -.00  (.00)*** 
Metro -1.20 (.53)* -.31  (.13)* -1.33  (.19)*** -1.44  (.19)*** 
Income -.04 (.02)* -.04 (.01)*** -.01 (.01) -.03 (.00)** 
Population 65+ -.00  (.00) -.00 (.00)* -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) 
Intercept 25.26 (3.08)*** 13.46 (.80)*** 97.86 (1.86)*** 78.10 (1.12)*** 
Notes: *=p-value<.05**= p=value<.001; ***=p-value  <.0001; 1 supplemental coefficient reporting for time and state dummy variables contained in Appendix B; 2 coefficients 
reported for NQAP award winners only; 3 HPRD=hours per resident day; 4 HHA=Home Health Agencies 
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Discussion 
 Findings partially support our hypotheses of NQAP award recipients would have better 
performance on the 19 publicly reported NHC quality measures analyzed.  Building upon prior 
work examining the NQAP award recipients, this study demonstrates deployment of Baldridge 
principles to improve processes may assist NHs in achieving better quality outcomes.  While 
these findings are promising, based upon the analyses conducted, we cannot tease out exactly 
what was done within the individual NHs to achieve better quality outcomes.  
Consistent with Porter’s product differentiation conceptual framework, NQAP award 
recipients were mostly for-profit and members of a chain. Therefore, we believe NHs, which 
applied for and won the award were doing so in order to differentiate their organization based 
upon quality.  Implementing the Baldridge principles contained within the Healthcare Criteria 
requires tremendous commitment and resources.  For-profit chains likely have more resources to 
devote leadership and staff time to develop, implement, and oversee process improvement 
efforts, which their nonprofit counterparts may not. Therefore, chain membership may alleviate 
some of the pressure NHs experience by sharing best practices with other affiliates. 
It does not come as a surprise that not all quality measures of interest were significant.  
First, Moreover, improving processes does not necessarily change publicly reported outcomes 
(Werner, Konetzka, & Kim, 2013 2013). Second, within our sample, there were 337 Silver and 
14 Gold level awardees. Scoring guidelines for the NQAP award do not require improvements 
on resident outcomes until the Gold level.  At the Silver level, awardees must demonstrate they 
have begun to develop effective, systematic processes to improve quality outcomes. Importantly, 
award applicants define which outcomes are important to them in their organizational profile and 
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those outcomes are the focus of the process improvement efforts they report on.  While it is easy 
to assume NHs would want to improve on publicly reported measures like NHC, outcomes can 
be anything the organization deems important (e.g., employee retention, market results).  
Therefore, awardees within our sample could potentially have selected outcomes to center 
process improvements around which are not contained within this study.  For example, 
interviews with providers in a study by Perraillon & colleagues (2017) suggest maximizing 
revenue and litigation avoidance often overshadows goals of performing well on NHC quality 
measures.  
In our sample, Florida NHs represented 13% of the NQAP award recipients followed by 
Massachusetts (n=28 or 8%) and Ohio (n=25 or 7%). A common thread among the three of the 
four statistically significant models was staffing for CNAs. Yet, CNA staffing levels among 
awardees and control groups were not statistically different with awardees averaging 2.57 HPRD 
and the control groups averaging 2.56 HPRD. Therefore, we speculate process improvement 
resulting from deployment of the Baldridge principles may have influenced award recipients to 
use CNA staffing more effectively resulting in better resident outcomes. This may be due to 
better strategic planning, alignment of strategic objectives and goals and the creation of effective 
action plans and monitoring.  Another factor may be the NQAP award recipients have found a 
way to engage its CNA workforce to operate more effectively.  A key Baldridge principle within 
the Healthcare Criteria is assessment of all workforce segments.  NH participants not only assess 
core competencies of staff members and needed changes in health service offering requirements; 
they are also required to assess how they manage workforce engagement. In other words, how 
does the organization get “buy in” from its workforce to effectively carry out the organization’s 
mission. CNA staffing turnover is a major challenge among the NH workforce and has been 
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shown to have a negative association with NH quality (Castle, 2005, 2006). While we do not 
assess turnover specifically within the framework of this study, it may be an important topic to 
explore. This would allow further insight into why NQAP award recipients have better outcomes 
despite similar levels of CNA staffing.  
Limitations  
While this study provides important insight on the relationship between NQAP award 
receipt and publicly reported NHC quality measures, it is not without limitations.  First, only 
members of AHCA/NCAL are eligible to apply for the NQAP award.  We attempted to mitigate 
this issue by constructing annual control groups, which consisted of NHs which would also have 
been eligible to apply for the award if they were members.  Approximately, 9,000 NHs are 
members of AHCA/NCAL and we did not have information on whether or not the NHs within 
the annual control groups were, in fact members or just higher performing NHs as defined by 
ACHA/NCAL’s criteria for award eligibility.   
Second, Bronze level award recipients were not included in this study. Given the criteria 
required to win a Bronze level award requires only completion of an organizational profile, it 
was not expected that Bronze level awardees were not expected to have implemented process 
improvements. Sensitivity analyses confirmed the method used in this study was appropriate. 
However, future work should examine whether differences exist between this group, awardees at 
the Silver or Gold level, and other NHs across the nation.  
Examination of statistically significant facility characteristics (Table 2) suggest NQAP 
award winners and the annually constructed control groups had meaningful differences (e.g., 
profit status, occupancy, resident acuity) which likely led to the insignificant findings. While this 
study was exploratory in nature, future work should consider alternative matching methods such 
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as propensity score matching which would allow pairing based upon specified covariate values.  
Ultimately, this technique may provide a more balanced comparison. 
Another limitation to the study is secondary data was utilized. Given the 
OSCAR/CASPER data elements contained within the AHCA analytic database are not collected 
for research purposes but rather serve as a function for administrative purposes, its validity for 
assessing NH quality has been questioned.  Despite criticism, the data are widely relied upon 
within the literature examining NH quality and remains the best source of information for 
research purposes. Additionally, during the study period, the OSCAR was replaced with 
CASPER, which captures activity on a continual basis rather than a one point in time.  While this 
change provides more accurate reporting from annual surveys, our analysis does not account for 
this change.  Therefore, we have no way of knowing whether this change in data collection had 
an impact on our findings.  
  Finally, due to confidentiality requirements, this study does not include information on 
NHs, which applied for the award and were unsuccessful.  A direct comparison between NQAP 
award winners and unsuccessful applicants may provide additional insight related to operational 
differences. Despite these limitations, this study establishes a positive relationship between 
NQAP award recipients and publicly reported NHC quality measures, suggesting deployment of 
Baldridge Principles may serve as a mechanism to guide quality improvement efforts. 
Conclusion 
This study is the first to examine the association between NHC quality measures and NHs 
which have won the AHCA/NCAL NQAP award at the Silver and Gold level during 2010-2015.  
Given the move toward value based healthcare reimbursement, it is important to understand how 
NHs can improve resident outcomes and this work provides additional insight into how an 
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association sponsored award process may guide quality improvement efforts.  Given the systems 
based Big “Q” approach utilized in the Healthcare Criteria, further analysis is warranted to 
examine individual categories within the framework to determine what is driving higher quality 
outcomes.  
In light of the new regulatory requirements within the ACA, the focus on quality 
improvement in NHs is shifting from quality assurance (regulatory compliance) to performance 
improvement (continual assessment). The Healthcare Criteria provides a comprehensive 
framework and roadmap for NHs to assess organizational performance, identify opportunities for 
improvement, develop processes to improve performance, and to utilize systematic, fact-based 
approaches to assess progress, all of which are essential elements of continual performance 
improvement.  Therefore, understanding how the Healthcare Criteria can guide quality 
improvement in NHs is beneficial to providers, stakeholders, and the residents NHs serve. 
Study 1 Implications  
While this study provides insight as to how winning a AHCA/NCAL NQAP award may 
guide quality improvement, it also explicates a broader policy issue.  As specifically designed, 
the NHC website produces quality information on all NHs certified to receive reimbursement 
from Medicare and Medicaid.  The tool provides consumers the opportunity to make an educated 
choice when choosing a NH.  However, findings within this study suggest NHC quality measure 
outcomes may provide a limited picture of overall quality.  While resident outcomes are of 
extreme interest to NHs for reimbursement, they may not be of the utmost import to consumers.   
Recognizing the complexity of NH care, NHs which participate in the NQAP award are 
required to focus on all aspects of their business, including leadership, workforce, knowledge 
assets, suppliers, etc.   Each of these components have the capacity to improve the quality of 
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care; however, improvements or excellence in any of these other areas cannot be revealed from a 
simple search on NHC.  Other work in this area also suggests providers may manipulate quality 
ratings through coding changes wherein no real impact occurs on resident outcomes.  Therefore, 
this study speaks to the need for refinement of NHC as a consumer-focused tool as it may not 
provide a complete picture of NH quality. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE NATIONAL QUALITY AWARD PROGRAM: IS AWARD STATUS 
ASSOCIATED WITH BETTER FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE? 
Introduction 
Nursing homes (NHs) provide long term care services and supports to approximately 1.4 
million individuals, predominantly age 65 and over (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2017). The 
government, through Medicare and Medicaid, pays for approximately 57% and 14% 
respectively, of the care delivered in the NH setting(American Health Care Association, 2018). 
Projections suggest a rising demand of post-acute care and an increasing complexity of resident 
care needs over the next two decades (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2010). 
However, changes in reimbursement over the past two decades have forced NHs to operate with 
limited resources.  Previous research suggests lower efficiency may be instigated by reductions 
in revenue (Zhang, Unruh, & Wan, 2007). Ultimately, the financial performance of NHs is 
impacted by the organization’s ability to control costs and to generate new revenue.  Therefore, it 
is important to understand how NHs can operate efficiently, with fewer resources, and maintain 
the quality of care delivered to residents. 
Pursuant to the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA), NHs receive Medicare 
reimbursement under a Prospective Payment System (PPS) in which a predetermined, fixed per 
diem amount is paid for services and adjusted for individual NH case mix (i.e., acuity of 
individual residents) based upon a diagnostic related groups classification system (Medicare 
Learning Network, 2015). The BBA also afforded states the right to set Medicaid reimbursement 
rates, a cost shared by states and the federal government.  Despite efforts to improve efficiency, 
research findings suggest provider 
39 
 
reports of financial instability (United States General Accounting Office, 2002) and a 
negative impact on overall quality (Konetzka, Norton, & Kilpatrick, 2004; Unruh, Zhang, & Wan, 
2006).  
Utilization of quality improvement methodology in the NH setting has been scarce and 
leadership’s knowledge of such methods is limited  (Smith, Castle, & Hyer, 2012).  However, a 
comparison of financial performance among hospitals recognized as a Top 100 Hospital® by 
Thomas Reuters and hospitals receiving a MBQNA suggested award recipients may experience a 
higher adjusted profit margin (Foster & Chenoweth, 2011). Hospital leadership has also suggested a 
reliance on Baldridge principles to adjust strategic plans related to competition, markets and the 
economy (Shook & Chenoweth, 2012).  
Examining financial performance and stability is a key component of the Healthcare 
Criteria.  As such, NHs are required to address outputs to both external and internal customers.   
Within the framework of this study, senior leadership and shareholders serve as customers who are 
interested in the financial well-being of the organization.  Regardless of profit status, NHs strive to 
increase revenue and lower costs.  However, operational differences exist between nonprofit and 
for-profit NHs due to their overarching mission.  Nevertheless, the Healthcare criteria warrants a 
high level of senior leadership commitment by linking available resources to strategic goals, in 
order to promote financial success (Leonard & McGuire, 2007). 
Industry based association memberships, such as AHCA/NCAL, are often a mechanism 
deployed by an organization to differentiate itself against competitors.  Further, participation in a 
trade association often affords members access to both tangible (information, services, products) 
and intangible benefits (e.g., common purpose, networking). To date, no research has explored the 
relationship between financial performance and the receipt of a NQAP award. Therefore, we 
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hypothesized that NQAP award receipt would be associated with more efficient financial 
performance at the time of winning the award. 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Financial Performance of NHs. Research on the financial performance and quality within 
the NH industry is mixed. Approximately 2/3 of NHs operate on a proprietary basis (Jones, 2002; 
Kaffenberger, 2000) and studies suggest for-profit facilities may deliver lower quality care than 
their nonprofit counterparts (O'Neill et al., 2003), consistent with a profit-maximization model. 
O’Neill and colleagues (2003) suggest for-profit NHs may not be willing to invest in quality 
initiatives requiring large capital investments and reduction in profit to stakeholders. Additionally, 
the researchers also suggest increasing proprietary profit is more likely to have an adverse impact 
on care quality than in a nonprofit NH. This may be due to the obligation of nonprofit NHs to 
reinvest any profits back into the organization which may include quality improvement initiatives 
(Hillmer et al., 2005).  More recent analyses suggest quality outcomes and higher costs are not 
mutually exclusive (Weech-Maldonado et al., 2012; Weech-Maldonado et al., 2003a); (Park & 
Werner, 2011).  
Aside from direct reimbursement, regulatory activity also has the ability to affect NH 
profitability. For example, one study suggested federally mandated staffing levels may negatively 
impact NH profitability given licensed nursing staff is the biggest expenditure (Bowblis & Brunt, 
2014). Another study suggests mandated publicly reported performance measures may be linked to 
higher profit margins subsequent to quality improvement efforts; however, the results were only 
approaching significance (Park, Konetzka, & Werner, 2010). 
Other factors associated with financial profitability include the racial composition of NH 
residents (Chisholm, Weech-Maldonado, Laberge, Lin, & Hyer, 2013), ownership by a private 
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equity firm (Cadigan, Stevenson, Caudry, & Grabowski, 2015) and quality of care (Weech-
Maldonado et al., 2012). Previous research suggests the uncertainty of financial returns for quality 
improvement activities may hinder NHs from allocating already scarce resources to quality efforts 
(Castle et al., 2016).  However, practices of management within a NH can positively impact care 
quality (Castle & Decker, 2011; Temkin-Greener, Zheng, Cai, Zhao, & Mukamel, 2010 Zhao & 
Mukamel, 2010). 
Work by Weech-Maldonado and colleagues (2003) demonstrated NHs which attempted to 
differentiate themselves based on quality care, experienced lower patient costs and reported better 
overall financial performance. As such, organizations attempting to differentiate themselves from 
competitors through receipt of a NQAP award, may operate more efficiently and achieve better 
financial performance.   
Within this dissertation framework, we speculate NHs, which become members of 
AHCA/NCAL and subsequently apply for and successfully receive a NQAP award are doing so in 
order to differentiate themselves within the industry based upon quality. Therefore, we 
hypothesized that NQAP award recipients would have higher total profit margins and higher 
operating profit margins as compared to a control group, as a result of systematically improving 
organizational processes utilized in the Healthcare Criteria.  
Method: Data & Research Design 
To examine the relationship between receipt of a NQAP award and financial performance, 
four sources of data were merged for 2008-2015. First, an analytic database from the American 
Health Care Association National Center of Assisted Living (AHCA/NCAL Analytic Database) was 
utilized. The AHCA/NCAL Analytic Database consists of key variables from the Online Survey 
Certification and Reporting Database (2008-2012), the Certification and Survey Provider Enhanced 
Reporting Database (2012-2015), average total deficiency scores by state, and identification of 
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NQAP award recipients (2010-2015). Variables, excluding award recipient information and average 
deficiency scores by state, consisted of widely-utilized facility-level characteristics (e.g., 
operational characteristics, staffing, deficiency citations) derived from inspections which occur 
every nine to fifteen months and are mandated for recertification for Medicare and Medicaid 
reimbursement (Office of the Inspector General, 2001). Next, the AHCA Analytic Database was 
merged with data from ltcfocus.org (LTCF). The LTCF data is a publicly available product 
maintained at Brown University Center for Gerontology and Healthcare Research. The data allows 
researchers to examine various resident and facility characteristics in order to carry out research in 
long-term care settings (Brown University, 2016). The LTCF Data was utilized for aggregated 
facility-level resident care requirements and an aggregated county-level measure of market 
concentration.  Third, the Area Health Resource File contains publicly available demographic 
information maintained by the U.S. Health Resources and Services Administration and consists of 
national county-level data on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of markets where 
NHs operate. Finally, Medicare Cost Report (MCR) data were utilized for all NHs, which had a 
reporting period of at least 360 days.  The MCRs are derived from annual financial data submitted 
by all NHs certified to receive reimbursement from the CMS.  The reports contain information on 
individual facility characteristics, utilization, costs, and charges and is publicly available for use by 
researchers. While the quality of this data has been questioned (Kane & Magnus, 2001), the MCR 
data remain the most practicable option to assess NH financial performance and has been widely 
relied upon (Bowblis, 2011a; Chisholm et al., 2013; Weech-Maldonado et al., 2012).   
These data sources were merged to create a dataset from 2011-2015 with a three-year 
lookback to compare NQAP award recipients and annually constructed control groups of NHs, 
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which met the eligibility requirements to apply for a NQAP award. Construction of the annual 
control groups is described below.  
Measures 
Dependent Variables. To examine NH profitability, two main dependent variables were 
utilized. First, operating profit margin was calculated.  Based upon previous work, this measure has 
been utilized to assess financial performance of NHs (e.g.,Weech-Maldonado et al., 2012; Weech-
Maldonado et al., 2003a) in order to understand NH profit margins without the influence of non-
operating revenue (e.g., charitable contributions, earned interest). The analysis of the operating 
profit margin assesses operational efficiency (Weech-Maldonado et al., 2012) and focuses solely on 
core business operations (Gapenski, 1999). As such, operating profit margin was calculated as: 
[Operating profit margin= (net patient revenue-operating cost)/ net patient revenue] 
To calculate net patient revenue, contractual allowances and discounts was deducted from 
total patient revenues. Expenses directly attributable to patient revenues was then summed and 
treated as operating costs.   
Second, total profit margin was examined which has been used in previous studies assessing 
the financial performance of NHs (Weech-Maldonado et al., 2003a). Total profit margin is an 
overall measure of financial performance, which includes all expenses (operating, non-operating) 
and revenues (operating and non-operating) and was calculated as follows: 
[Total profit margin = net income/ total revenue] 
 To gain a full understanding of the underlying components of NH financial performance, 
operating revenue per patient-day and operating costs per patient day were also included. To 
understand revenue accrued based upon services provided to residents, operating revenue per 
patient-day was calculated as follows:  
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 [Operating revenue per patient day=operating revenues/ total patient days] 
 In order to understand expenses accrued based solely upon services provided to residents, 
operating costs per patient day was calculated as follows: 
 [Operating costs per patient day= operating costs/total patient days] 
 Independent Variables. A dichotomous independent variable, awardee, was created from 
the AHCA analytic database and utilized to evaluate the relationship between receipt of a NQAP 
award at the Silver or Gold level (0=no award; 1=award at the Silver or Gold level) and NH quality. 
NHs at the Bronze level are deemed to be just beginning their quality journey and are not required 
to demonstrate use of systematic processes to improve quality. Similar to the work of Castle and 
colleagues (2016), the subsequent analysis includes only Silver and Gold level awardees. Bronze 
level awardees were however eligible for inclusion in the annually constructed control groups.   
Covariates. A total of sixteen control variables deemed to have an influence on the quality 
of NH care were included.  First, to account for resident case mix and individual needs of NH 
residents, we controlled for resident acuity. Created by the Cowles Group(2002), the acuity index 
combines unique treatment needs of NH residents and activities of daily living dependencies on a 
scale ranging from 0 (low need) to 38 (high need). Derived from the OSCAR/CASPER data, the 
acuity index is widely utilized in NH quality literature (Grabowski et al., 2016 et al., 2017; Hyer et 
al., 2011 Harman, et al., 2011). We also controlled for the percentage of NH residents with a 
psychiatric diagnosis as previous research suggest individuals with psychiatric related needs are 
often admitted to lower quality NHs (Li et al., 2013).  
Facility characteristics deemed to have an impact on quality were also included. 
Specifically, previous research has suggested larger facilities may have the ability to restructure 
staffing resources, potentially influencing quality. To account for this, a measure of size, total 
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number of beds was included.  Additionally, the occupancy rate of a NH is commonly utilized as a 
proxy measure for performance (Zinn et al., 2009). Therefore, occupancy was also included. Profit 
status is also associated with quality and previous findings have suggested for-profit NHs deliver 
poorer quality of care than their nonprofit counterparts (Hillmer et al., 2005). Therefore, we 
controlled for profit status (0=no, 1=yes).  Chain affiliation has been shown to be related to quality 
(e.g., Banaszak-Holl et al., 2002; Castle & Fogel, 1998; Harrington et al., 2001), albeit findings 
have been mixed. Therefore, the variable chain membership (0=no, 1=yes) was be controlled for. 
We also controlled for whether or not a NH was situated in a metropolitan area (0=no; 1=yes) area 
given NHs which operate in urban areas may have access to better staffing pools and may 
fundamentally address quality concerns differently. Payer source has also been found to be 
associated with NH quality.  For example, research suggests a higher proportion of Medicaid 
residents is associated with lower quality (Mor et al., 2004) while a higher proportion of Medicare 
is associated with higher quality (Kim, Harrington, et al., 2009); therefore, we control for the 
proportion of Medicaid resident and the proportion of Medicare residents. A plethora of studies 
have demonstrated a relationship between direct care staffing levels and the quality of care (Castle, 
2008; Harrington, Kovner, et al., 2000; Harrington et al., 2012; Hyer et al., 2011).  Therefore, three 
staffing measures were also controlled for including RN total hours per resident day, LPN total 
hours per resident day, and CNA total hours per resident day. For example, RN staffing hours per 
resident day was calculated as 𝑅𝑁 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝐷 = (((𝑅𝑁𝐹𝑇 + 𝑅𝑁𝑃𝑇) ∗ 2080)/365)/𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠).  
The same method was used to calculate LPN HPRD and CNA HPRD. 
Previous research examining quality suggests the market structure and operating 
environment within which a NH operates has the potential to influence quality strategies. Therefore, 
we included a measure of market concentration, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, as well as the 
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number of adults 65+ within the county, and per capita income by county as covariates in our final 
models (Castle et al., 2016 & Hansen, 2016; Hyer et al., 2013; Hyer et al., 2011).  We also 
controlled for the number of home health agencies within the county the NH operates. Home health 
agencies offer a substitution for NH care and may be an option for residents who require lower care 
absent quality NH options.  
Previous work has suggested states may differ on the deficiencies they emphasize during the 
survey process (Castle & Ferguson, 2010).  Therefore, we constructed 47 state dummy variables 
(0=no; 1=yes) to control for state variation in the survey certification process using Alabama as the 
reference group. Finally, six dummy variables were created for time signifying which year the 
sample was being evaluated in (e.g., Sample_2010, Sample_2011). Operational definitions of 
covariates utilized in subsequent analyses are contained within Table 7. 
Table 7.  Operational Definitions of Study 2 Covariates. 
Variable Definition 
Acuity index Level of resident care required 
Psychiatric diagnosis % of residents with psychiatric diagnosis 
Total beds Total number of beds 
Occupancy number of residents/number of beds 
Profit status For profit status (0=no; 1=yes) 
Chain   Member of a chain (0=no; 1=yes) 
Medicaid Proportion of Medicaid residents 
Medicare Proportion of Medicare residents 
CNA HPRD  Hours per resident day of certified nursing assistant time 
LPN HPRD  Hours per resident day of licensed nurse time 
RN HPRD Hours per resident day of registered nurse time 
Herfindahl Index Measure of market concentration 
Home health agencies # of home health agencies by county 
Metro Located in a metropolitan area (0=no; 1=yes) 
Per capita income Per capita income by county/$1,000 
Population 65+ Proportion of population over 65 by county/1,000 
Sample_(Year) Time dummy variables signifying year of study period (2011-
2015) 
State 46 state dummy variables (0=no; 1=yes) 
 
 
47 
 
Sample Construction 
Annually constructed control groups were created to examine the association between 
winning a NQAP award and financial performance. NHs were selected based upon eligibility to 
apply for the NQAP award. Key variables in the AHCA analytic database were analyzed to 
determine eligibility for inclusion in the control groups by examination of non-compliance with 
approximately 180 regulatory standards. Deficiency citations resulting from non-compliance were 
then assessed on two dimensions including scope (how many residents are affected) and severity 
(likelihood of harming residents).  Scope is trichotomized into isolated, a pattern, or a widespread 
practice. Severity has four categories (no harm, no harm and potential for minimal harm, actual 
harm, and immediate jeopardy requiring immediate corrective action).  
Within this study, total deficiency scores were calculated pursuant to the methodology 
utilized by AHCA/NCAL for the NQAP by assigning points for individual deficiencies and their 
respective scope/severity (A-M).  Explicitly points were assigned as follows: A=1, B=2, C=3, D=4, 
E=5, F=6, G=7, H=8, I=9, J=10, K=11, L=12, M=13.  Then, all NHs, which had a deficiency with a 
scope/severity above “I”, were removed from the sample. 
Finally, NHs with three total deficiency scores less than their respective state’s average 
score for three years prior to winning the award were included in the control group. For example, 
when constructing the control group for comparison to award winners in 2011, data from annual 
surveys from 2008-2010 were used and total deficiency scores were calculated.  If a NH’s total 
deficiency score was lower than their state’s average for each of the years within the lookback 
period (2008-2010), the NH was included in the control group for 2011. This process was repeated 
for each year of the study period.   
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The number of NHs included in the annually constructed control groups varied across the 
study period creating a non-stationary panel dataset.  Award recipients were excluded from the 
control groups regardless of the year being analyzed.  A total of 11,960 unique NHs were included 
in the annually constructed control groups over the study period.   Final count information on the 
NQAP award recipients and annually constructed control groups can be found in Table 8.   
Table 8. Annually Constructed Control Group Counts 
 
Year 
Award Recipients 
Silver              Gold 
 
Control Group 
2011 29 1 7,680 
2012 46 2 7,352 
2013 51 4 7,583 
2014 75 3  8,308 
2015 77 3 5,307  
 
The final sample was then limited to NQAP award recipients and controls with a fiscal year 
beginning in January of the year of interest if the NH reported at least 360 days within the fiscal 
year.  For example, a NH application for an award would be submitted by January; however, 
applicants are not notified of award receipt until June of the same year.  Given the purpose of this 
study was to examine whether or not process improvements NHs undergone in order to win the 
NQAP award resulted in better financial performance, this fiscal period was used as it would likely 
reflect financial benefits which may be realized subsequent to process improvements.    
Other data cleaning consisted of removing hospital-based NHs from the sample given 
hospital-based NHs receive higher reimbursement and are able to staff at higher levels (Harrington 
et al., 2001). Therefore, resource differences may influence the quality of care delivered.  NHs with 
less than 30 beds or more than 800 beds were also omitted from the control group due to operational 
differences. Additionally, staffing outliers were trimmed pursuant to guidelines by Harrington and 
colleagues (Harrington et al., 2012), and NHs with greater than 24 hours per resident day and total 
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staffing greater than three standard deviations above the mean were considered outliers and 
removed from the sample.   
In order to trim outliers from the MCRs, the cost and revenue variables were winsorized by 
omitting values which were in the lowest 1st percentile or top 99th percentile (Bowblis, 2015)  A 
final sample of 291 NQAP awardees were utilized in subsequent analyses. A final sample of 38,809 
observations were included in subsequent analyses. 
Analyses  
The empirical models estimated the relationship between receipt of a NQAP award and four 
measures of financial performance. Using the NH year as the unit of analysis, pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression analyses were deployed and modeled as follows for each of the four 
outcome measures:    
𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑊𝑖𝑡𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where  FP is equal to the expected value of the dependent variable (e.g., total profit margin, 
operating profit margin), W represents a dichotomous variable signifying NQAP award receipt 
(0=no; 1=yes) and X represents county-level covariates (e.g., per capita income, population 65+).  
Additionally, δ  represents time-invariant facility-level characteristics (e.g., profit status, chain 
membership) and Τ  is equal to a set of time dummy variables (e.g., sample2010, 
sample2011…sample2015) which signify the year of analysis. As modeled, the analyses assume the 
effect of winning the award (W) and the individual covariates added into the model are stable over 
the study period.   
Given the nonstationary sample of NQAP recipients and annually constructed control groups 
across the study period, OLS pooled regression is more efficient and produces coefficients which 
depict the average relationship between the dependent and independent variables over the cross 
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sections within the study period(Phillips & Moon, 1999).  A Hausman specificity test verified the 
method was appropriate (Hausman, 1978).   
Results  
During the study period (2011-2015), there were 291 NQAP awardees, which received an 
award at the Silver or Gold level.  Annually constructed control groups based upon NQAP award 
eligibility ranged from 5,307 to 8,308 thousand per annum.  There were 11,960 unique NHs 
included in the annually constructed control groups and inclusion was not restricted by year.  
Therefore, NHs may serve as controls during multiple years across the study period.  
Within the study sample, award recipients were mostly for-profit (82%), members of a chain 
(83%) and over half (65%) were located in a metropolitan area.  On average, NQAP award 
recipients had lower average deficiency scores (M=19.19, SD=9.20) than the annually constructed 
control groups (M=29.82, SD=9.01) and the national sample (M=31.44, SD=40.27). NQAP award 
recipients had on average higher total profit margins (M=.010, SD=.037) than the control groups 
(M=.003, SD=.162) and better operating profit margins (M=.001, SD=.197) compared to control 
groups (M=-.080, SD=1.141). Descriptive statistics for award recipients, annually constructed 
control groups, and national comparison data are provided in Table 9. 
Table 10 provides parameter estimates for the model regression coefficients. Regression 
models examining total profit margin and operating profit margin did not support our hypothesis 
that NQAP award recipients would experience better financial outcomes.   However, examination of 
operating costs PPD, while not significant, suggests an inverse relationship between winning a 
NQAP award and costs.  Additionally, the relationship between receipt of an NQAP award and 
revenue, while not significant, suggested a positive relationship.   
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Table 9.  Descriptive Statistics for Study 2. 
  Group Mean Difference 
 
Variable 
National 
(n= 15,120) 
NQAP Recipients 
(n=291) 
Control  
(n= 36,518)1 
 
95% 
 
t 
 
Dependent Variables Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD CI (χ2) df 
Operating revenue PPD2 179.232 75.431 264.740 89.113 261.944 196.322 -17.34, 9.21 .60 215.54 
Operating costs PPD2 185.463 89.761 259.791 88.40 276.118 234.654 2.87, 28.15 2.42* 238.14 
Total profit margin .007 .198 .010 .037 .003 .162 -0.01, -0.00 -3.03* 234.96 
Operating profit margin -.624 13.721 .001 .197 -.080 1.141 -.11, -.05 -5.12*** 279.11 
Covariates          
Acuity index 11.68 1.47 12.087 1.031 11.594 1.517 -.28, -.04 -2.61* 302.08 
Psychiatric diagnosis (%) .30 .19 .293 .172 .299 .187 -.02, .02 .10 28211 
Total beds 116.06 62.69 114.687 48.056 113.710 61.397 -6.11, 5.07 -.18 300.01 
Occupancy  .82 .16 86.610 10.835 82.589 14.664 -5.29, -2.76 -6.28 301.22 
Profit Status 73% --- 82% --- 69% --- --- 24.01*** 1 
Chain Membership 55% --- 83% --- 57% --- --- 82.55*** 1 
Medicaid (%) .61 .21 61.782 17.099 60.751 20.971 -2.92, 1.05 -.93 299.08 
Medicare (%) .14 .12 16.645 11.784 13.962 11.768 -4.00, -1.28 -3.82*** 28211 
CNA HPRD3 2.55 .74 2.605 .538 2.567 .722 -.10, .02 -1.28 301.14 
LPN HPRD3 .91 .39 .837 .327 .912 .375 0.38, .11 3.97*** 297.86 
RN HPRD3 .48 .34 .570 .308 .511 .330 -.11, -.03 -3.79*** 28211 
Herfindahl Index .62 .33 .296 .322 .279 .306 -.15, -.07 -5.77*** 286.82 
Home health agencies 3.75  24.45 20.196 77.196 25.767 92.287 -4.80, 13.73 .95 355.86 
Metro 28% --- 65% --- 62% --- --- 7.54* 1 
Income  37.62 10.09 41.927 13.043 42.308 12.019 -.58, 2.44 1.22 293.42 
Population 65+/1,000 13.738 39.211 56.932 127.588 42.308 12.019 16.64, 46.35 4.17*** 300.61 
Note: 1 Control group n represents # of observations across the study period (NHs could have served as controls in multiple years). 2 PPD=per patient day; 3 
HPRD=hours per resident day. 
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Table 10.  OLS Regression Results Examining Financial Performance of Silver and Gold Awardees (2011-2015)1 
 
 
Total Profit  
Margin 
Operating Profit 
 Margin 
Operating  
Revenue PPD 
Operating  
Costs PPD 
Variable Coefficie
nt 
S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Win=12 .007 (.009) .032 (.067) -6.543 (17.155) -14.839 (18.002) 
Acuity index .003 (.000)** .013 (.005)* 3.981 (1.238)** 2.549 (1.1444)* 
Psychiatric dx (%) -.009 (.006) -.058 (.039) 16.541 (9.910) 34.061 (9.580)** 
Total beds .000 (.000)*** .000 (.000)*** -.023 (.030) -.171 (.029)*** 
Occupancy  .000 (.000)*** .003 (.000)*** .215 (.135) -.371 (.131)* 
Profit Status .013 (.002)*** .147 (.017)*** -44.741 (4.289)*** -70.545 (4.100)*** 
Chain  -0.01 (.002)*** .000 (.014) 11.663 (3.621)** 1.657 (3.462) 
Medicaid (%) .000 (.000)*** .009 (.000) -1.488 (.116)*** -2.911 (.112)*** 
Medicare (%) .000 (.000)*** .010 (.000)*** 1.530 (.191)*** -.003 (.185) 
CNA HPRD3 -.000 (.001) -0.020 (.010)* 5.337 (2.631)* 11.332 (2.535)*** 
LPN HPRD3 -.003 (.003) .013 (.020) 15.668 (5.174)* 21.904 (4.978)*** 
RN HPRD3 -.009 (.004)* -.036 (.026) 57.436 (6.602)*** 75.964 (6.496)*** 
Herfindahl Index -.000  (.000) -.000 (.000) -12.224 (10.393) -14.684 (9.962) 
HHA4  .010 (.000) -.000 (.000) -.123 (.039)* -.070 (.035)* 
Metro -.000 (.002) -.004 (.019) 10.053 (4.916)* 15.594 (4.706)** 
Income -.000 (.000) -.003 (.000) .798 (.187) *** 1.626 (.186)*** 
Population 65+ .000 (.000) -.000 (.000) .058 (.027)* .034 (.025) 
Intercept -.138 (.017)*** -1.15 (.120)*** 207.819 (30.711)*** 373.354 (29.436)*** 
Note*=p-value<.05**= p=value<.001; ***=p-value <.0001; 1 supplemental coefficient reporting for time and state dummy variables provided in  
Appendix E. 2 Results are reported for award recipients only; 3 HPRD=hours per resident day; 4HHA=Home health agencies
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Discussion  
Within the product differentiation conceptual framework, we expected NQAP award 
recipients would experience better financial outcomes when compared to other high performing 
NHs at the time of award.  Presumably, by differentiating the organization based upon quality, an 
organization would be able to be more selective about its case mix and potentially charge higher 
prices to private pay residents. This subsidization could in theory allow them to experience better 
financial performance and higher profit margins.  While our hypothesis was not supported, this 
study provides new insight into the financial environment of NQAP award winners compared to 
other high performing NHs.   
Within our sample, NQAP award winners, on average, had higher occupancy levels, 
residents with higher acuity, and a slightly higher proportion of Medicaid residents.  Post hoc 
analyses suggested a statistically significant difference in operating costs PPD between NQAP 
awardees ($259.79) and control groups ($276.12) which would result in an approximate $6,598 
reduction in costs for a 30 day period.  There were also statistically significant differences in total 
profit margin and operating profit margin between the two groups (see Table 8).   
Assessment of all work processes is a key component of the Healthcare Criteria beginning 
with strategic planning for meeting customer’s key requirements as well as planning for the future.   
Our non-significant findings may be due to the timing of the MCRs utilized for assessment.  For 
example, we selected MCRs for the same fiscal year as the award was achieved.  Given the majority 
of NQAP award recipients were Silver level awardees, they may have just begun to implement 
systematic processes to improve their organization.  Therefore, any process improvements 
implemented may not have translated to financial impact. Future work may be benefit from 
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utilization of MCRs for the year after or potentially two years after award receipt to determine if 
there are differences in profit margins.     
Historically, many believed NH quality and costs were inversely related.  In other words, the 
more a NH invested, the better the quality.  Within this study, costs of NQAP award recipients were 
lower and revenues were slightly higher even with comparable direct care staffing level, the highest 
expenditure for NHs.  Therefore, deployment of Baldridge Principles may improve NH financial 
performance.  
Limitations 
While this study provides insight information relative to the financial performance of NQAP 
award recipients, it is not without limitations.  First, our study utilized the fiscal year of award 
receipt to analyze financial performance.  Given the majority of NQAP awardees within our sample 
were Silver level recipients, process improvements may not have been in effect long enough to see 
an impact on financial performance.   
Second, only members of AHCA/NCAL are eligible to apply for the NQAP award.  We 
attempted to mitigate this issue by constructing annual control groups, which would also have been 
eligible to apply for the award if they were members.  Approximately, 9,000 NHs are members of 
AHCA/NCAL and we did not have information on whether or not the NHs within the annual 
control groups were, in fact members or just higher performing NHs.  Second, Bronze level award 
recipients were not included in this study. Given the criteria required to win a Bronze level award 
requires only completion of an organizational profile, it was not expected that Bronze level 
awardees would have implemented process improvements. However, future work should examine 
whether differences exist between this group and national NHs.  
Another limitation to the study is secondary data was utilized. Given the OSCAR/CASPER 
data elements contained within the AHCA analytic database is not for research purposes but rather a 
55 
 
function for administrative and payment purposes, its validity for assessing NH quality has been 
questioned.  However, the data relied upon is widely utilized within the literature examining NH 
quality and remains the best source of information for research purposes. Additionally, during the 
study period, the OSCAR was replaced with CASPER, which captures activity on a continual basis 
rather than a one point in time.  While this change provides more accurate reporting from annual 
surveys, our analysis does not account for this change.  Therefore, we have no way of knowing 
whether this change in data collection had an impact on our findings.  
Examination of statistically significant facility characteristics (Table 8) suggest NQAP 
award winners and the annually constructed control groups had meaningful differences (e.g., profit 
status, occupancy) which likely led to the insignificant findings. While this study was exploratory in 
nature, future work should consider alternative matching methods such as propensity score 
matching which would allow pairing based upon specified covariate values.  Ultimately, this 
technique may provide a more balanced comparison. Additionally, the use of MCRs was limited to 
only those NHs who had filed a cost report for the fiscal years in questions.  Additionally, financial 
information within the MCRs can be unreliable and include information such as negative revenues.   
Finally, due to confidentiality requirements, this study does not include information on NHs, 
which applied for the award and were unsuccessful.  A direct comparison between NQAP award 
winners and NH applicants would allow for a more detailed comparison on awardees and other high 
quality NHs.  Despite these limitations, this study is the first to examine the financial performance 
among NQAP award recipients compared to other high performing NHs. 
Conclusion 
The financial performance of the NH industry has experienced instability over the past three 
decades.  Projections suggest national health expenditures for Medicare and Medicaid are projected 
to increase per annum by 7.4% and 5.8% from 2017-2026 (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
56 
 
Services, 2018a). Given the increase in alternative options for long-term care (e.g., home health 
agencies, assisted living facilities), the acuity level of NH residents being cared for will continue to 
increase.  While NHs with a higher proportion of Medicare and private pay residents which likely 
have access to more capital than their competitors (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 
2016), NHs with a high proportion of Medicaid residents may not fare as well.  An increase in 
Medicaid reimbursement is not likely, therefore, identifying ways to improve the efficiency and 
financial performance of NHs is one of great import now and increasingly so in the next two 
decades as baby boomers require long-term care.   
Study 2 Implications  
Findings from this study, while not significant in our pooled OLS Regression Models, do 
suggest NQAP award recipients are finding ways to reduce costs and increase revenue.  Given the 
movement toward value-based reimbursement and overall quality, identifying mechanisms for NHs 
to deploy for quality improvement efforts is critical. Specifically, Florida SB 2506 has proposed a 
Quality Incentive Program to reward high quality and/or high efficiency NHs, specifically, those 
with a NHC 4 or 5 Star Quality Rating or Gold Seal Status. Under the proposed bill, potential 
projected outlays exceed $258 million additional reimbursement to Florida’s NHs(Parker, August, 
2017). Therefore, poor quality is no longer an option, as NHs bottom line will suffer if they do not 
rise to the challenge.  
One of the major components of the Healthcare Criteria’s focuses on resource use, 
operational effectiveness, and financial results.  We speculate that through integration and 
organization of all processes within the operating environment, NQAP award winners were able to 
identify opportunities for improvement in their work processes, which are moving them in the right 
direction and may ultimately lead to greater financial impacts in the form of better profit margins.  
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Given the instability of the NH financial environment, identifying how tools such as Baldridge 
principles contained in the Healthcare Criteria that may improve financial performance is 
imperative. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Discussions of Findings 
 The two studies contained within this dissertation attempted to provide insight on whether or 
not NHs which have won a NQAP award perform better on publicly reported quality measures and 
experience better financial performance.  Given the enduring concern surrounding the quality of 
care, NH residents receive and the financial instability of the NH industry, this study illustrates the 
value of implementing Baldridge-based principles within an organization.    
First, performance on publicly reported NHC quality measures were examined.  While only 
four of the 23 measures were significant, associations between NQAP receipt and each individual 
measure were in the right direction and approaching significance.  Given the criteria for the Silver 
level award only requires NHs to be in the beginning stages of developing process improvements, 
NHs within the study period may been in the beginning stages of developing process improvements.  
Notably, some NHAs are not given carte blanche to make decisions about choice of improvement 
efforts nor the resources implementation may take.   Full implementation of Baldridge’s systems 
based approach may take five to seven years (Leonard & McGuire, 2007); therefore, NHs may be at 
a disadvantage because of financial stress and historically high staff turnover among direct care 
workers, specifically CNAs.   
The QAPI framework developed by CMS through a collaborative effort with key 
stakeholders, consumer groups, and subject matter experts is similar to that of the Baldridge 
framework and has been provided as a resource for QAPI (Siegel, Young, Zysberg, & Santillan, 
2015).  Absent reimbursement for NHs to engage in continuous quality improvement efforts, NHs 
59 
 
may have been hesitant to make the commitment; however, individual states’ such as 
Florida’s commitment to quality may incentivize them to follow suit. 
Implications of Dissertation Research 
Projections suggest NHs will serve residents with higher care needs over the next two 
decades due to other options for long-term care (e.g., assisted living, home health) despite the 
historic financial instability of the industry subsequent to the BBA. Therefore, the importance of 
delivering high quality care is vital. The latest legislation under the ACA requires NHs to develop a 
Quality Assurance Performance Improvement Plan; however, research suggests leadership may lack 
the necessary skills (Smith et al., 2012).   
Given the newly published QAPI regulations, the Healthcare Criteria may serve as a 
roadmap to guide NH leadership on their quality improvement path and may improve organization 
efficiency resulting in better financial performance.  The systems-based Healthcare Criteria 
provides a big “Q” approach for NHs to assess organizational performance, identify opportunities 
for improvement, develop systematic processes to improve performance, and to utilize fact-based 
analyses to assess progress.  Understanding how the Healthcare Criteria may improve the quality of 
care and financial performance of NHs is beneficial to NH providers, the residents they serve, as 
well as policymakers to ensure the viability of an industry primarily serving vulnerable older adults.   
It is well-known top leadership plays an important role in NH quality improvement efforts, 
CNAs may also serve as a leader in improving participation among staff in QI efforts which has the 
potential to improve their job satisfaction as well as contribute to improving the quality of care 
delivered (Woo, Milworm, & Dowding, 2017 2017).  Senior leadership communication and 
engagement of all levels of staff is critical and necessary to achieve high performance levels while 
staying true to the organization’s missions and values.   
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Implementing Baldridge principles through the application of the Healthcare Criteria is time 
consuming and requires consistent commitment at all levels of the organization, which may deter 
some NHs from embarking on the journey.  However, both of the studies contained herein suggest 
AHCA/NCAL membership and going through the application process for the NQAP may allow 
NHs to differentiate themselves based upon quality and experience better financial returns.   
CMS recently announced its Patient over Paperwork Initiative. In accordance with the White House 
Administration’s desire to cut the “red tape” for businesses, the Patient over Paperwork Initiative 
seeks to streamline regulation by analyzing the meaningfulness of current quality measurement 
data. Given the time consuming nature of the (reducing administrative task time  )current data 
reporting, the initiative should elicit more time between care providers and their patients (Centers 
for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2018b). What remains to be seen is whether quality will suffer.  
Previous research has examined the impact of whether incentives “the carrot” or regulations “the 
stick” are more efficacious in promoting quality.  Most research suggests the stick is the most 
influential (Mukamel et al.) 
Future Directions 
Findings from both studies offer several opportunities for future research relative to NHs 
which apply for and successfully receive a NQAP award.  First, the use of propensity score 
matching could be deployed in order to achieve a more balanced comparison between NQAP award 
winners and control groups.  Additionally, similar to Castle and colleagues (2016), the analysis of 
the relationship between award receipt and publicly reported quality measures could be examined 
longitudinally to determine if significant relationships exist following the award receipt in 
subsequent years rather than analyzing the year the award was won. Given that Silver level 
awardees are not required to demonstrate actual outcome improvement, it may take more time than 
was allotted to see these differences in NHC quality measures.   
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Another measure of quality that has not received as much attention are consumer 
complaints.  A study by Hansen and colleagues (2017) suggest complaints and complaint 
investigations have the ability to provide additional information regarding the quality of care 
outside of the data researchers typically focus on.  The Healthcare Criteria specifies the need to 
assess an organization’s process to engage customers and assess satisfaction/dissatisfaction.  
Therefore, NQAP awardees may experience less consumer complaints to state agencies as they are 
proactively dealing with consumer concerns.  Therefore, future work will examine how quality 
award winners compare to other NHs relative to complaints (Hansen, Hyer, Holup, Smith, & Small, 
2017).  
Finally, the Healthcare Criteria consists of seven individual components including 
Leadership, Strategy, Customers, Measurement Analysis, Workforce, Operations, and Results.   It 
may be beneficial to examine the relationship between these components (to the extent data is 
available) to determine if performance on one component drives overall performance.  For example, 
structural equation modeling could be utilized to determine the strength of each of these individual 
components relationships with the outcomes of interest.   We suspect leadership would have a 
strong relationship given they set the tone for the organization and are ultimately charged with 
carrying out the organization’s mission, managing resources, and assuring the deliverance of high 
quality of care.   
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Appendix B. Supplemental Pooled OLS Regression Results Examining Short-Stay Quality Measures of Silver and Gold 
Awardees (2010-2015)1 
 Antipsychotic  
Medication 
Influenza  
Vaccination 
 
Pain 
Pressure  
Ulcers 
Pneumonia  
Vaccination 
  
Coefficient 
 
S.E.  
 
Coefficient 
 
S.E.  
 
Coefficient 
 
S.E. 
 
Coefficient 
 
S.E. 
 
Coefficient 
 
S.E. 
Sample_2010 --- --- 3.04 2.44 -0.53 0.25* 4.47 0.14*** 15.55 0.41*** 
Sample_2011 -6.43 0.17*** -0.08 2.43 4.17 0.22*** -5.83 0.12*** 13.44 0.36*** 
Sample_2012 -6.64 0.16*** 2.48 2.43 2.71 0.22*** -6.38 0.12*** 15.15 0.35*** 
Sample_2013 -6.90 0.16*** 3.87 2.43 0.45 0.22* -6.75 0.12*** 15.95 0.35*** 
Sample_2014 -7.08 1.25*** 0.00 . -2.85 1.63 -6.82 0.85*** 12.46 2.59*** 
AR 2.00 0.67* 5.31 1.41** 0.07 0.86 0.75 0.43 6.74 1.31*** 
AZ -0.26 0.64 6.51 1.23*** 10.08 0.79*** 0.20 0.42 7.97 1.28*** 
CA -0.71 0.45 1.32 0.91 4.36 0.57*** 1.28 0.30*** 2.53 0.91*** 
CO 0.63 0.54 -4.31 1.08*** 4.80 0.68*** 0.58 0.36 -4.37 1.07* 
CT -0.16 0.51 -1.87 1.01 4.09 0.64*** 0.58 0.34 0.47 1.02* 
DC 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . 
DE 0.52 1.13 2.69 2.18 -0.55 1.38 0.73 0.73 3.19 2.17** 
FL 0.87 0.42* 0.21 0.84 2.26 0.53*** 1.01 0.28** 3.50 0.85*** 
GA 1.81 0.69* 1.70 1.11 -0.82 0.74 1.03 0.39* 3.08 1.16*** 
IA 1.52 0.50* 2.15 0.99* 3.40 0.62*** 1.34 0.32*** 3.02 0.97*** 
ID 0.40 0.89 0.44 1.54 8.18 1.07*** 0.03 0.56 3.93 1.69** 
IL 0.59 0.50 -2.16 1.00* 2.28 0.63 1.56 0.33*** 0.01 1.00* 
IN 0.56 0.44 -1.04 0.90 1.72 0.57 1.16 0.30*** -0.43 0.90* 
KS 1.57 0.62* -2.22 1.10* 4.96 0.73*** 0.99 0.38* -3.40 1.12* 
KY 1.12 0.51* 2.30 1.01* 2.71 0.64*** 0.89 0.34* 3.64 1.02*** 
LA 1.69 0.51** -1.40 0.96 0.62 0.62 1.06 0.32** 1.08 0.96* 
MA 0.03 0.45 5.10 0.90*** 3.57 0.57*** 1.14 0.30*** 5.78 0.90*** 
MD 0.55 0.52 -0.19 1.02 -1.08 0.65 0.93 0.35* 1.22 1.04 
ME -1.47 3.16 -0.97 7.44 8.37 4.09* 1.41 2.22 -0.33 6.73*** 
MI -0.11 0.43 -2.69 0.88* 2.81 0.56*** 0.96 0.29** -0.31 0.89 
MN -0.05 0.47 -1.62 0.96 7.84 0.60*** 0.63 0.32* 0.81 0.96* 
MO 0.55 0.45 -3.42 0.89*** 3.77 0.56*** 1.13 0.29*** -4.83 0.88*** 
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 Antipsychotic  
Medication 
Influenza  
Vaccination 
 
Pain 
Pressure  
Ulcers 
Pneumonia  
Vaccination 
  
Coefficient 
 
S.E.  
 
Coefficient 
 
S.E.  
 
Coefficient 
 
S.E. 
 
Coefficient 
 
S.E. 
 
Coefficient 
 
S.E. 
MS 0.78 0.88 -1.52 1.45 0.04 0.98 1.69 0.50** 1.24 1.49*** 
MT 0.44 0.83 -3.49 1.71* 9.77 1.06*** 0.92 0.54 -7.50 1.64*** 
NC 0.33 0.48 -0.23 0.92 2.08 0.59** 0.45 0.31 1.51 0.95*** 
ND 2.15 1.39 -0.77 3.94 10.55 1.77*** 1.94 0.97* -11.20 2.71 
NE 1.39 0.64* 0.11 1.19 5.12 0.77*** 0.50 0.39 -1.07 1.17* 
NH 0.45 0.84 5.60 1.68** 3.77 1.07** 1.66 0.57* 10.14 1.73*** 
NJ -0.07 0.50 3.10 1.00* -2.01 0.63** 2.04 0.33*** 5.13 1.01*** 
NM -0.05 1.15 -8.65 2.94* 9.50 1.60*** 0.69 0.82 -10.00 2.49*** 
NV 1.11 0.87 -0.66 1.68 6.95 1.13*** 1.51 0.61* -0.67 1.84 
NY 0.11 0.44 2.25 0.90* -0.52 0.56 1.23 0.30*** 4.35 0.90*** 
OH -0.02 0.41 0.75 0.81 6.93 0.52*** 0.83 0.27* 3.40 0.82*** 
OK 2.35 0.75** -1.37 1.41 10.37 0.91*** 2.07 0.46*** -2.92 1.36 
OR -0.98 0.65 -2.05 1.25 10.48 0.81*** 0.28 0.43 -0.74 1.29 
PA 0.37 0.40 -1.62 0.81* 3.33 0.51*** 1.10 0.27*** 0.95 0.81* 
RI 0.06 0.76 0.64 1.76 5.33 1.01*** 1.70 0.54 2.57 1.64 
SC 1.44 0.76* 1.61 1.31 -2.76 0.86** 1.40 0.46* 3.52 1.38*** 
SD 0.47 0.91 -3.42 1.58* 5.69 1.10*** 2.69 0.54* -3.69 1.61* 
TN 1.04 0.57 -0.45 1.04 -0.31 0.68 1.11 0.36*** -1.43 1.09 
TX 0.92 0.60 -3.37 1.03** 0.34 0.70 0.73 0.36* -2.36 1.09* 
UT 0.00 . 1.54 16.40 58.14 11.37*** 4.03 6.16 -3.58 18.70 
VA 0.69 0.69 -1.39 1.35 0.92 0.92 0.85 0.49 -0.31 1.48* 
VT -0.09 1.65 -4.32 3.03 2.14 2.09 0.39 1.07 -1.97 3.24 
WA 0.35 0.82 1.61 1.59 8.30 1.09*** 0.99 0.58 3.25 1.74* 
WI -0.51 0.71 2.68 1.34* 5.33 0.91*** 0.68 0.48 7.38 1.45*** 
WV 2.14 4.76 -0.99 9.50 -3.63 6.58 1.35 3.57 -1.53 10.83 
Note: *=p<.05, ** p<.001, ***p<.0001 
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Appendix C.  Supplemental Pooled OLS Regression Results Examining Long-Stay Quality Measures of Silver and Gold Awardees (2010-
2015)   
  
ADL Decline 
Antipsychotic  
Medication 
 
Falls 
 
Incontinence 
 
UTI 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient  S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Sample_2010 -3.44 .62*** --- --- --- --- 16.85 0.40*** -1.69 0.13*** 
Sample_2011 19.11 .54*** 3.96 0.18*** -4.80 0.09*** 7.14 0.39*** -3.09 0.11*** 
Sample_2012 -2.21 .54*** 2.75 0.18*** -4.90 0.09*** 8.63 0.38*** -3.66 0.11*** 
Sample_2013 -3.01 .54*** 0.44 0.18* -5.01 0.09*** 9.24 0.38*** -4.62 0.11*** 
Sample_2014 -.78 4.03 -2.56 1.36 -5.27 0.64*** 11.62 2.85*** - 5.10 0.83*** 
AR -2.83 1.95 -1.55 0.70 0.61 0.33 0.91 1.42 0.35 0.41 
AZ 6.88 2.01** -0.59 0.76 0.89 0.36* 10.97 1.51*** 2.72 0.42*** 
CA 1.23 1.39 -6.57 0.50*** -0.91 0.24*** 4.75 1.02***                                                                                                                                                                                                            1.34 0.29*** 
CO .96 1.60 -3.86 0.59*** 0.39 0.28 6.90 1.13*** 1.74 0.33*** 
CT 1.62 1.55 -0.05 0.57 0.10 0.27 3.43 1.10* 0.74 0.32* 
DC 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . 
DE 3.87 3.18 -2.59 1.19* 0.65 0.56 1.86 2.34 2.10 0.66** 
FL .57 1.29 -0.96 0.47* -0.03 0.22 4.07 0.91*** 2.82 0.27*** 
GA .85 1.72 -0.21 0.70 0.16 0.33 5.30 1.21*** 1.99 0.36*** 
IA 1.83 1.42 -2.56 0.51*** 0.16 0.24 3.18 1.07* 3.03 0.29*** 
ID 2.48 2.67 -1.65 0.99 0.05 0.47 12.15 2.34*** 1.03 0.55 
IL -.80 1.53 -1.88 0.55** 0.37 0.26 1.37 1.07 2.11 0.32*** 
IN 3.13 1.36* -2.40 0.49*** 0.46 0.23 8.06 0.98*** 1.47 0.28*** 
KS 1.05 1.58 -3.03 0.59*** 1.32 0.27*** 2.77 1.20* 3.36 0.33*** 
KY 3.10 1.52* -1.36 0.56* 0.69 0.26* 7.35 1.10*** 3.09 0.32*** 
LA 3.12 1.44* -0.75 0.52 0.68 0.25* 0.11 0.99 2.22 0.30*** 
MA .80 1.37 -0.27 0.49 0.22 0.23 11.11 0.97*** 2.09 0.28*** 
MD 3.63 1.60* -3.87 0.59*** 0.20 0.28 9.49 1.15*** 0.34 0.33 
ME 1.75 11.05 1.75 3.72 -0.80 1.76 1.36 8.80 2.40 2.16 
MI -1.54 1.36 -7.72 0.48*** -0.21 0.23 7.38 0.97*** 0.96 0.28** 
MN .13 1.45 -6.12 0.52*** 0.60 0.24* 8.83 1.08*** 0.77 0.30* 
MO .57 1.33 -2.30 0.48*** 0.58 0.23* -1.13 0.96 2.18 0.28*** 
MS -1.25 2.12 -1.23 0.84 -0.53 0.40 5.27 1.52** 1.23 0.44* 
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ADL Decline 
Antipsychotic  
Medication 
 
Falls 
 
Incontinence 
 
UTI 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient  S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
MT 1.95 2.36 -4.11 0.86*** 0.63 0.40 3.63 1.80** 1.29 0.49* 
NC 5.04 1.45** -5.09 0.54*** 0.44 0.26 12.10 1.02*** 2.78 0.30*** 
ND 6.13 3.42 -4.29 1.38** 0.19 0.65 2.05 2.36 -0.43 0.70 
NE 3.72 1.68* -2.50 0.62*** 0.60 0.29* 6.42 1.32*** 2.32 0.35*** 
NH 1.33 2.51 -1.17 0.91 1.48 0.43** 8.74 1.86*** 2.26 0.53*** 
NJ 2.34 1.55 -4.78 0.56 -0.18 0.26 -6.17 1.09*** 1.08 0.32* 
NM 4.61 3.73 -3.83 1.29*** 1.59 0.59* 6.58 2.58* 0.55 0.78 
NV 5.47 2.91* -2.10 1.03* -0.40 0.48 7.45 2.12** 2.13 0.60** 
NY 7.30 1.36*** -3.36 0.49*** -0.06 0.23 3.38 0.94** 1.60 0.28*** 
OH 1.60 1.24 -2.78 0.45*** 0.48 0.21* 1.86 0.88* 2.89 0.26*** 
OK 6.91 1.91** -3.12 0.72*** 1.52 0.33*** 1.08 1.44 3.07 0.40*** 
OR 8.18 2.09*** -4.22 0.79*** -0.63 0.37 5.05 1.99* 2.24 0.43*** 
PA 5.15 1.23*** -2.40 0.44*** 0.25 0.21 13.04 0.87*** 0.72 0.26* 
RI 8.15 2.43* -2.89 0.85** 0.49 0.40 2.56 1.81 3.64 0.51*** 
SC 7.36 2.10** -4.26 0.85*** -0.30 0.40 12.97 1.55*** 3.38 0.44*** 
SD .78 2.11 -5.07 0.77*** 1.27 0.36** 8.79 1.78*** 1.34 0.44* 
TN 2.17 1.66 0.89 0.64 0.06 0.30 4.18 1.17** 2.42 0.35*** 
TX 6.00 1.63** -0.21 0.63 0.88 0.30* 4.74 1.17*** 2.30 0.34*** 
UT 0.00 . 0.00 . -2.99 3.24 0.00 . 3.25 3.47 
VA 4.78 2.33* -0.98 0.80 0.17 0.38 11.70 1.74*** 1.62 0.48** 
VT .91 4.97 -1.68 1.73 0.99 0.82 11.21 4.71* 1.78 1.03 
WA -3.11 2.75 0.26 0.94 0.11 0.44 11.44 2.16*** 1.31 0.57* 
WI -2.55 2.25 -5.94 0.80*** 0.13 0.38 4.17 1.89* 0.98 0.47* 
WV 10.76 16.62 -6.12 5.60 -0.40 2.65 14.53 10.08 2.14 3.48 
Note: *=p<.05, ** p<.001, ***p<.0001 
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Appendix C.  Supplemental Pooled OLS Regression Results Examining Long-Stay Quality Measures of Silver and Gold Awardees (2010-
2015)  Continued  
 Weight 
Loss 
Pressure  
Ulcers 
Physical  
Restraints 
 
Catheter 
 
Depression 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Sample_2010 -3.85 0.11*** -2.96 0.18*** -4.58 0.12*** -3.37 0.10*** 15.77 0.40*** 
Sample_2011 -4.33 0.10*** -6.74 0.16*** -5.00 0.10*** -4.17 0.09*** -1.98 0.36*** 
Sample_2012 -4.19 0.10*** -7.21 0.16*** -5.44 0.10*** -4.59 0.09*** -2.29 0.36*** 
Sample_2013 -4.10 0.10*** -7.71 0.16*** -6.04 0.10*** -5.27 0.09*** -3.26 0.36*** 
Sample_2014 -4.85 0.73*** -6.44 1.16*** -6.10 0.76*** -5.14 0.68*** -3.66 2.64 
AR -0.81 0.36* 1.48 0.58* 0.51 0.37 0.51 0.33 -1.40 1.29 
AZ -0.29 0.37 0.83 0.60 -0.21 0.38 2.09 0.35** 4.73 1.33** 
CA -0.92 0.25** 0.28 0.40 1.34 0.26*** 0.90 0.24** 0.26 0.91 
CO -0.15 0.30 -0.78 0.48 0.74 0.31* 2.03 0.27*** 4.76 1.06*** 
CT -0.39 0.29 -0.61 0.45 0.39 0.30 0.12 0.26 1.49 1.03 
DC 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . 
DE -1.26 0.58* -0.25 0.91 -0.19 0.60 -0.74 0.54 -0.37 2.08 
FL -0.22 0.24 0.94 0.37* 1.29 0.25*** 0.50 0.22* 1.67 0.85* 
GA 0.44 0.32 1.58 0.50* -0.03 0.33 -0.57 0.29* 4.71 1.14*** 
IA -1.09 0.26*** 0.55 0.43 0.20 0.27 2.25 0.24*** 4.19 0.93*** 
ID -0.45 0.49 -1.97 0.82* 0.00 0.50 1.50 0.45** 0.97 1.77 
IL 0.60 0.28* 1.05 0.45* 1.18 0.29*** 1.58 0.26*** 6.58 1.01*** 
IN 0.23 0.25 0.66 0.40 0.15 0.26 0.80 0.23** 1.96 0.89* 
KS -0.29 0.29 0.47 0.51 -0.66 0.30* 1.01 0.27** 5.98 1.03*** 
KY 0.98 0.28** 1.08 0.44* 1.79 0.29*** 1.27 0.26*** 3.69 1.01** 
LA -0.12 0.27 3.07 0.42*** 2.35 0.27*** 1.07 0.25*** 0.44 0.95 
MA -1.26 0.25*** -0.12 0.39 1.17 0.26*** 0.56 0.23* 3.51 0.90*** 
MD -1.44 0.29*** 1.69 0.46** 0.23 0.30 -0.16 0.27 3.45 1.05** 
ME -0.83 1.91 -2.24 2.91 -2.36 1.98 3.48 1.77* 11.69 7.34 
MI 0.06 0.25 0.92 0.39* 1.05 0.26*** 0.95 0.23*** 2.68 0.90* 
MN -0.17 0.27 -0.10 0.43 0.32 0.27 1.64 0.25*** 5.45 0.96*** 
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 Weight 
Loss 
Pressure  
Ulcers 
Physical  
Restraints 
 
Catheter 
 
Depression 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
MO -0.73 0.24* 1.55 0.40*** 0.37 0.25 0.94 0.23*** 2.01 0.88* 
MS 0.26 0.39 2.05 0.64** 2.44 0.41*** -0.42 0.36 -1.43 1.41 
MT 0.05 0.44 -1.08 0.79 -0.20 0.45 1.87 0.41*** 4.13 1.58** 
NC 0.91 0.27** 2.15 0.41**** 0.59 0.28* 0.27 0.25 2.72 0.96* 
ND -0.72 0.62 0.29 1.08 -2.12 0.64** 0.66 0.57 9.83 2.19*** 
NE -1.18 0.31*** -0.13 0.54 -0.36 0.31 1.73 0.29*** 9.79 1.09*** 
NH 0.13 0.46 -0.53 0.76 0.56 0.48 2.11 0.43*** 5.22 1.67* 
NJ 0.04 0.29 2.51 0.45*** 1.56 0.29*** 0.09 0.26 2.55 1.02* 
NM 1.19 0.68 2.27 1.11* 0.72 0.70 0.14 0.63 1.84 2.46 
NV -0.92 0.53 1.70 0.83* 0.36 0.55 2.20 0.49*** 0.87 1.92 
NY -0.79 0.25* 2.49 0.39*** 0.85 0.26** 0.52 0.23* 10.70 0.90*** 
OH 0.31 0.23 0.68 0.36 1.34 0.24 1.28 0.21*** 10.92 0.82*** 
OK 0.59 0.35 2.85 0.64*** 0.00 0.36*** 1.49 0.33*** 6.44 1.25*** 
OR 0.14 0.38 0.36 0.63 0.17 0.39 2.07 0.36*** 10.40 1.35*** 
PA -0.06 0.23 0.88 0.35* 0.39 0.23 1.22 0.21*** 4.69 0.82*** 
RI -0.71 0.45 2.14 0.73* 0.47 0.46 0.35 0.42 3.36 1.61* 
SC 1.13 0.39* 1.72 0.61* 2.15 0.40*** -0.59 0.36 2.63 1.39* 
SD -0.01 0.39 2.66 0.75** 0.01 0.40 2.95 0.36*** 5.83 1.40*** 
TN 0.64 0.31* 0.45 0.48 1.82 0.32*** 0.51 0.28 0.55 1.10 
TX -1.27 0.30*** 0.78 0.48 0.04 0.31 0.62 0.28* 5.84 1.07*** 
UT 1.63 3.07 0.00 . 0.36 3.17 0.63 3.47 6.01 11.02 
VA 0.09 0.42 1.61 0.67* -0.38 0.44 -0.02 0.39 2.39 1.53 
VT 0.42 0.92 -0.14 1.44 -0.33 0.94 1.91 0.84* 11.17 3.26** 
WA -1.25 0.50* 0.21 0.79 -0.24 0.52 1.03 0.47* 9.37 1.81*** 
WI -0.39 0.41 -0.18 0.68 -0.09 0.43 1.74 0.38*** 2.87 1.47* 
WV -0.56 3.07 1.04 4.68 -4.58 0.12 1.41 2.84 3.68 11.05 
Note: *=p<.05, ** p<.001, ***p<.0001 
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Appendix C. Supplemental Pooled OLS Regression Results Examining Long-Stay Quality Measures of Silver and Gold Awardees (2010-
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 Anxiety/Hypnotic 
Medication 
 
Pain 
Influenza  
Vaccination 
Pneumonia  
Vaccination 
Variable Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Sample_2010 -2.42 .19* -10.19 0.17*** -2.07 1.49 12.67 0.24*** 
Sample_2011 -3.01 .14*** -1.19 0.15*** -2.22 1.49 16.66 0.22*** 
Sample_2012 0.78 .13 -3.10 0.15*** -0.15 1.48 17.11 0.22*** 
Sample_2013 .98 .20** -5.10 0.15*** 0.49 1.48 17.27 0.22*** 
Sample_2014 -4.22 .15 -6.32 1.12*** 0.00 . 16.58 1.59*** 
AR -1.83 1.65 0.89 0.54 2.24 0.81* 4.26 0.78*** 
AZ -0.25 2.31 5.40 0.56*** 2.65 0.78* 4.33 0.81*** 
CA -3.36 1.34* 1.43 0.38 0.73 0.55 3.16 0.55* 
CO -7.73 1.56*** 2.46 0.44 -3.16 0.64*** -1.86 0.64*** 
CT -3.33 1.63 0.31 0.43 -1.15 0.61 1.71 0.62 
DC 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . 
DE -3.06 2.96 1.03 0.87 3.25 1.26* 4.77 1.27 
FL -0.08 1.33 0.25 0.35 -0.84 0.51 2.11 0.52*** 
GA -5.62 2.52* 1.54 0.47** 1.86 0.65* 4.12 0.69* 
IA -5.00 1.39** 1.89 0.39*** 0.43 0.56 3.62 0.56* 
ID 0.00 . 4.20 0.76*** 0.67 0.97 3.72 1.06* 
IL -3.89 1.51* 1.08 0.42* 0.58 0.61 1.61 0.61 
IN -6.13 1.35*** 0.95 0.37 0.53 0.54 1.38 0.54 
KS -6.73 1.85** 2.88 0.44*** 0.35 0.60 1.24 0.63* 
KY 0.43 1.54 2.62 0.42*** 0.92 0.60 3.00 0.61** 
LA -3.28 1.48* 1.07 0.39* 1.08 0.57 1.35 0.58 
MA -5.44 1.35*** -0.09 0.37 1.75 0.54* 4.31 0.55*** 
MD -7.16 1.64*** -0.76 0.44 1.64 0.63* 2.43 0.64 
ME 7.23 7.40 5.29 3.00 3.70 4.66 -4.84 4.18 
MI -5.63 1.34*** 1.24 0.37** -2.49 0.54*** 1.29 0.54 
MN -10.92 1.46*** 3.23 0.40*** 0.20 0.57 2.05 0.58 
MO -2.83 1.27* 2.59 0.37*** -0.11 0.53 -2.32 0.53*** 
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 Anxiety/Hypnotic 
Medication 
 
Pain 
Influenza  
Vaccination 
Pneumonia  
Vaccination 
Variable Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
MS -8.17 2.74* 2.83 0.58*** 0.38 0.81 3.49 0.86 
MT -5.40 2.19* 4.93 0.68*** -2.29 0.96* -2.81 0.95*** 
NC -0.16 1.66 2.23 0.40*** -0.38 0.57 2.88 0.58 
ND -7.75 2.22** 2.15 0.94* -2.11 1.62 2.45 1.34*** 
NE -8.00 1.77*** 2.86 0.47*** -0.17 0.64 1.92 0.66 
NH -6.77 2.98* 3.06 0.70*** 1.48 0.97 5.48 1.01*** 
NJ -3.84 1.49* -1.72 0.43*** 2.46 0.62*** 3.98 0.62*** 
NM -8.73 2.72** 4.17 1.05*** -8.60 1.68*** -8.83 1.48*** 
NV -6.00 6.30 2.65 0.81** -4.02 1.06*** -1.22 1.15 
NY -7.37 1.29*** -0.44 0.37 2.03 0.55** 4.83 0.55*** 
OH -3.21 1.27* 3.22 0.34*** -0.54 0.49 2.08 0.50*** 
OK 3.02 1.96 5.82 0.54*** 0.36 0.74 -1.08 0.76* 
OR -7.46 2.33** 6.19 0.62*** -3.95 0.78*** -0.17 0.81 
PA -4.12 1.17** 1.79 0.34*** -0.59 0.49 1.24 0.50 
RI -9.02 1.98*** 0.16 0.68 0.51 1.03 1.69 0.97 
SC -4.19 3.02 0.65 0.58 1.86 0.80* 4.93 0.85* 
SD -6.42 3.02* 3.53 0.60*** -0.52 0.80 1.66 0.84* 
TN 1.29 2.68 0.02 0.46 0.96 0.63 -0.22 0.67 
TX 0.00 . 1.75 0.45*** 0.45 0.61 1.79 0.65* 
UT 0.00 . 5.08 7.77 4.80 5.94 5.52 6.70 
VA 0.00 . 1.04 0.63 -0.43 0.84 1.82 0.92 
VT 0.00 . 3.93 1.43* -2.36 1.77 0.49 1.98 
WA 0.00 . 4.54 0.77*** -0.46 0.99 3.03 1.10 
WI 0.00 . 2.05 0.64* 1.53 0.82 4.23 0.90*** 
WV 0.00 . 0.33 4.51 2.02 5.95 3.03 6.72 
Note: *=p<.05, ** p<.001, ***p<.0001 
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(2011-2015) 
 
 
Total Profit  
Margin 
Operating Profit 
Margin 
Operating  
Revenue PPD 
Operating  
Costs PPD 
Variable Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Sample_2011 0.08 0.02** -1.39 0.06*** -52.24 16.27** 3.24 4.87 
Sample_2012 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -15.55 4.32** -14.68 4.80* 
Sample_2013 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -18.48 4.27*** -16.02 4.76** 
Sample_2014 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.13 22.04 32.77 29.20 36.02 
AR 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.09 -7.03 23.05 -31.45 22.50 
AZ 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.09 -31.84 23.36 -7.86 22.19 
CA 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.07 26.16 18.78 1.88 18.23 
CO 0.02 0.01 0.14 0.08 -12.67 20.82 -47.33 20.33* 
CT -0.03 0.01 -0.27 0.09* 19.92 22.75 103.22 22.11*** 
DC 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . 
DE -0.06 0.02* -1.29 0.14*** 34.13 36.06 83.19 35.89* 
FL 0.00 0.01 -0.13 0.07 7.87 18.70 22.05 18.02 
GA -0.08 0.02*** -0.41 0.14* -21.33 34.73 -1.81 29.08 
IA 0.03 0.01** 0.34 0.07*** -76.39 19.13*** -135.40 18.45*** 
ID 0.05 0.02** 0.08 0.12 2.92 31.39 -22.94 28.58 
IL 0.02 0.01* 0.09 0.08 73.01 19.55** 38.47 19.13 
IN 0.03 0.01* 0.10 0.07 -18.68 18.76 -47.09 18.11* 
KS 0.03 0.01* 0.17 0.08* -54.68 20.69* -87.89 19.89*** 
KY 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.08 -17.10 19.85 -23.83 19.31 
LA 0.04 0.01** 0.03 0.08 -8.51 19.44 -0.17 18.76 
MA 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.07 -8.29 18.67 -30.81 18.02 
MD -0.02 0.01 -0.38 0.08*** 34.24 21.37 65.16 20.71* 
ME 0.04 0.11 0.08 0.76 -7.42 194.70 -46.36 217.51 
MI 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.07 12.44 18.72 10.15 18.06 
MN 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.08 -55.13 20.44** -79.98 19.76*** 
MO 0.02 0.01* 0.07 0.07 -39.82 18.53* -58.89 17.93* 
MS 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.12 9.43 30.57 0.60 25.28 
MT 0.02 0.02 0.17 0.11 -27.76 27.51 -54.26 26.54* 
NC 0.01 0.01 -0.10 0.10 -5.54 25.88 14.23 24.72 
ND 0.01 0.05 0.36 0.38 -55.25 98.28 -121.56 109.49 
NE 0.01 0.01 0.23 0.09* -58.06 22.79* -98.73 21.75*** 
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Total Profit  
Margin 
Operating Profit 
Margin 
Operating  
Revenue PPD 
Operating  
Costs PPD 
Variable Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
NH 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.12 12.33 29.91 -5.78 28.51 
NJ -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.08 36.66 19.38* 38.60 18.77* 
NM 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.13 -5.25 33.64* -13.00 35.15 
NV 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.14 28.00 34.70 7.87 32.47 
NY -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.07 51.69 18.57 55.58 17.96* 
OH 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.07 -23.59 18.06 -47.84 17.40* 
OK -0.07 0.01*** -0.05 0.10 -31.33 24.55 1.12 23.02 
OR 0.04 0.01* 0.19 0.09* 28.47 23.91 -15.75 23.08 
PA 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.07 15.45 18.04 36.08 17.44* 
RI 0.02 0.01 0.20 0.11* 16.97 26.98 -35.73 26.28 
SC 0.01 0.02 -0.18 0.14 -25.00 35.69 -3.39 32.23 
SD 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.12 -65.96 29.56 -110.14 27.83*** 
TN -0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.09 -25.73 22.23 -19.36 20.93 
TX 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.09 -44.63 22.60* -57.90 20.47* 
UT 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . 
VA 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.09 -19.70 23.74 -24.84 24.27 
VT 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.16 -6.75 41.72 -27.10 44.22 
WA 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.10 -7.16 25.77 -11.12 26.59 
WI 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.09 -29.37 24.09 -57.61 24.33* 
WV 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.44 62.90 113.36 45.42 126.44 
Note: *=p<.05, ** p<.001, ***p<.0001 
